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What can or should be done, if anything, to address complaints that corporate 
executives are overpaid?  This article argues that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is making  progress in the area of disclosure of executive 
compensation.  The SEC will not accomplish any substantial reform regarding 
compensation as a wider issue, however, because shareholders do not have much 
of a role in establishing executive compensation packages and have little ability 
to challenge board decisions after receiving the mandated disclosure.  Analyzing 
the Proposed Regulations and the Delaware Supreme Court decision In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, this article sheds light on how a gap has arisen 
in the area of executive compensation regulation.  It demonstrates how state law 
regulates gross negligence, waste and, perhaps, bad faith, while federal law 
focuses on disclosure of certain compensation packages.  The different focii of 
state and federal regulations creates a gap for behavior that might be adverse to 
shareholder interests, yet occur beyond the shareholders’ ability to effectuate 
changes.  Moreover, compensation decisions have characteristics that distinguish 
them from routine board decisions since the attributes of arms-length contracting 
are compromised.  Additionally, while disclosure of compensation data is 
important, it is not the equivalent of merit review and issues of information 
overload, boilerplate and complexity remain.  If the SEC is truly committed to 
reforming executive compensation, it must address the gap in regulation 
remaining after In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation.  The SEC and 
states could work cooperatively to implement more meaningful corporate 
governance reform to ensure that shareholders both have the information 
necessary to make informed investment decisions and the ability to effect changes 
in company decision-making.   
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Why are corporate executives paid so much and what are we doing about it?1 In the 
period between 1992 and 2000 alone, the compensation of chief executive officers 
 
1 The issue of the composition of and approach to executive pay has been the subject of extensive 
examination.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Compensation Chapter 8 (2004) [hereinafter, Pay without Performance]; Lucian A. 
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, 1 Berkeley Business Law 
Journal 291 (2004)(arguing that corporate boards have been able to camouflage compensation through 
retirement benefits and other payments) [hereinafter Stealth Compensation]; Lucian A. Bebchuk and 
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005) (analysis of the magnitude and 
composition of executive pension arrangements)[hereinafter Executive Pensions]; Mark J. Lowenstein, The 
Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000)(reviewing and evaluating 
the theories of executive compensation); James McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance: Rising Above the “Pay-for-Performance Principle, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2006)(arguing that 
pay for performance and agency theories are faulty); William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament Over 
Executive Compensation: Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
93 CA. L. R. 1557 (2005)(observing that management power matters and evaluating arguments about 
compensation practice); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TX. L. R. 
1615 (2005)(arguing no reform is needed and that the management power rests with the board solely); 
Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What 
Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. LEE L. R. 231 (2006)(examining the characteristics of a large 
number of executive employment contracts); Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?,
54 HAST. L. J. 437 (2003)(arguing that gaps between management and worker wages can affect company 
value). 
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(CEOs) at S&P 500 companies more than quadrupled, from $3.5 million to $14.7 
million.2 In 1991, the average large company CEO earned about 140 times the wage of 
the average company employee, but by 2003 it was 500 times.3 In 2005 the average CEO 
pay rose twenty-seven percent, compared to a rise of thirty-eight percent in 2004, while 
ordinary workers wages remained stagnant.4 Quite often these increases in compensation 
continue even where the corporation struggles with results.5 Other questions persist 
about whether executive compensation rewards performance of the executive or gains 
unrelated to the efforts of the executive.6 Of course, a high pay package itself does not 
indicate that the CEO’s pay is too much or not competitive.7
The debate concerning executive compensation packages has been much in the news and 
in the Courts.8 As to whether these high increases in executive compensation are a 
 
2 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 1; Patrick McGeehan, Options in the Mirror, Bigger than they 
Seem, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (describing how Lehman Brothers has used stock option 
grants and valuation to obscure compensation to its CEO).   Although much of the focus is on the most 
highly paid CEOs, there are indications that the CEOs of smaller companies have experienced substantial 
pay gains as well.  Amy Cortese, Smaller Fish are Also Doing Swimmingly, New York Times, April 9, 
2006, Sec. 3, at 7. 
3 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 1.  But see, Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 5-6 (arguing that comparisons to rank and file workers are not helpful as 
CEO payment involves stock options, whereas average worker pay does not). 
4 Eric Dash, C.E.O. Pay Keeps Rising and Bigger Rises Faster, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 
5 (citing to a Pearl Meyers survey of 200 CEOs included). 
5 Eric Dash, C.E.O. Pay Keeps Rising and Bigger Rises Faster, supra note 4, at 5 (boards at auto, retail and 
telecommunications companies increased CEO compensation in the wake of bad financial results); Eric 
Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 5 detailing 
the rising compensation practices of  ConAgra even during financial difficulties); Tommy McCall, Pay For 
Performance? Sometimes, but Not Always, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (outlining where 
stock prices fell, yet CEOs still paid well).  But see, Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 6-7 (arguing that analysis of pay to performance is not helpful because it is 
difficult to assess what is performance). 
6 See, e.g., J. Alex Tarquinio, Pay for Oil Chiefs Spiked Like Prices, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 
3, at 10 (describing the huge CEO packages for those in the oil industry in 2005, such as Exxon Mobil and 
Occidental Petroleum CEOs);Tommy McCall, Pay For Performance? Sometimes, but Not Always, New 
York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 6 (CEO pay is often greater than shareholder return by 10 points). 
7 See, e.g., Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1-2; Andrew R. 
Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, Harv. 
Bus. Rev., May-June 1992, at 28; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125; Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation 
Excessive?, in The Attack on Corporate America 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) ("Competition 
among corporations . . . sets the level of executive compensation."); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of 
Corporate Law, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 959, 975-78 (1980) (market forces will eliminate "excessive" 
compensation).  But see, Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American 
Executives (1991)(arguing that overpayment exists); Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE,
June 30, 2006 (80% of Americans think that CEOs are paid too much). 
8 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.  See also, 
Disney Investors Seek Reversal of Ovitz Ruling Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2006, C4; Benjamin 
Pimentel, HP Sued over Fiorina’s $42 Million in Exit Pay; Shareholders Say Company, Directors 
Disregarded Own Rules with Golden Parachute, San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 2006, at C1 (two 
institutional investors sued HP over Fiorina severance package allegedly in violation of board policy); 
Sanders v. Wang, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999)(shareholder challenge to granting of stock 
plan benefiting executives).  See also, e.g., Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE, June 30, 
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problem, there is much debate.  Orin Kramer, the Chaiman of the New Jersey State 
Investment Council, commented: 
 
And if you say, "Well, for senior executives, compensation has risen three 
and a half times faster than it has for average workers," then you can say, 
"That makes sense if either (a) there's a declining pool of people who can 
do these jobs, or (b) the job got something like three and a half times 
harder, or (c) maybe they're creating three and a half times as much value 
as executives used to create." If you have problems with those 
conclusions, the compensation levels are probably a little bit high.9
Shareholders, employees and the public in general  are often displeased with executive 
compensation levels.  Shareholder litigation brought against the board of the Walt Disney 
Company after they gave a $130 million severance package to Michael Ovitz has 
attracted much publicity and the recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court will be 
dissected for some time.10 Shareholder complaints over former HP CEO, Carly Fiorina’s 
$42 million severance package has led to new litigation.11 Employees at struggling 
companies such as ConAgra in Omaha Nebraska have seen their wages not keep pace 
with the cost of living and their bonuses eliminated at the same time that the former 
chairman and chief executive, Bruce Rohde, received bonuses, stock options and later 
retired with a $20 million package.12 It is hard to forget the public outrage toward former 
General Electric CEO Jack Welch when during his divorce proceedings it was discovered 
that his retirement package included Red Sox tickets, a luxury apartment in New York 
City, country club memberships and use of a GE corporate jet.13 
The current system of executive compensation raises a number of  important issues.  
First, investors rely on the availability of accurate disclosure of complete compensation 
data to assess company prospects and “stealth” or undisclosed compensation is an 
impediment to shareholder decision-making.14 Second,  the “considerable influence” that 
 
2006 (“the outrage has grown so intense that the country’s top CEOs are now vigorously debating the 
problem in private”). 
9 Orin Kramer, Pay Without Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. Corp. L. 773 
(2005).  In fact, a Watson Wyatt Worldwide survey of directors and institutional investors found that while 
only sixty-one percent of directors think that executives are overpaid, ninety percent of institutional 
investors believe executives are overpaid.  Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive 
Pay Model Mixed Reviews, Watson Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (last visited July 18, 2006). 
10 In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.  See also, Disney 
Investors Seek Reversal of Ovitz Ruling Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2006, at C4.. 
11 Benjamin Pimentel, HP Sued over Fiorina’s $42 Million in Exit Pay; Shareholders Say Company, 
Directors Disregarded Own Rules with Golden Parachute, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, March 8, 2006, at 
C1. 
12 Eric Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, NEW YORK TIMES, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, 
page 1. 
13 Disclosure Won't Tame C.E.O. Pay, The New York Times, January 14, 2006, at C1.  
14 Chairman Cox speech of January 17, 2006, available at Securities Exchange Commission Website,  
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm (last visited July 6, 2006)[hereinafter 
“Cox Speech”].  For a discussion of “stealth compensation” via retirement benefits, see Stealth 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 293. 
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executives have over their pay and the “influence” used to obtain it suggests that arms-
length contracting may not be present to the detriment of shareholders and employees.15 
Perhaps most importantly, even where shareholders have enhanced disclosure, 
shareholders do not have a substantial role in establishing executive compensation and 
little ability to challenge compensation decisions afterwards.16 
During a speech given on January 17, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Chairman Christopher Cox announced proposed revisions to the SEC’s existing rules 
(Existing Regulations) governing the disclosure of executive compensation (the Proposed 
Rules).17 The SEC subsequently published the Proposed Regulations, including a lengthy 
“Background and Overview” section detailing the SEC's assessment of the problem.18 
The SEC has received more than 20,000 public comments to its notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) and voted affirmatively to adopt changes to the Existing  
Rules on July 26, 2006.19 Characterizing the Existing Regulations as “out of date,” SEC 
Chairman Cox declared the SEC’s purpose “is to help investors keep an eye on how 
much of their money is being paid to the top executives who work for them.”20 
Commissioner Cox expressed concern that companies are not disclosing compensation 
information properly.21 
The Proposed Regulations deal with not only compensation issues, but related party 
transactions, director independence, and corporate governance.22 Among other things, the 
Proposed Regulations establish  a federal minimum threshold of $10,000 as a trigger for 
the disclosure of perks, require disclosure of retirement and severance packages, 
reorganize the overall presentation of disclosed compensation materials, and require 
disclosure of outstanding equity interests, including potential amounts the executive will 
receive in the future.23 The Proposed Regulations also require certain disclosures aimed 
at identifying independent directors and ensuring that related party transactions are more 
fully disclosed.24 
15 Stealth Compensation, supra note 1, at 293. 
16 See infra Part IV.C. 
17 Cox speech, supra note 14.  For the current requirements, see Executive Compensation Disclosure, 
Release No. 33–6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48125 (Oct. 16, 1992) [hereinafter the‘‘1992 Release’’]; See also 
Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests, Release No. 33–7032, 58 
Fed. Reg. 63010, at Section II (Nov. 22, 1993). 
18 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (2006)[hereinafter Proposed 
Regulations]. 
19 SEC Press Release of July 26, 2006, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm (last visited August 5, 2006). 
20 Cox Speech, supra note 13. 
21 Id.
22 Cox Speech, supra note 13.  See Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542. The SEC proposed a 
transition period for the Proposed Regulations with the earliest portions of the Proposed Regulations having 
effect sixty days after publication of final rules and the remainder of the rules, such as those related to the 
summary compensation table that will ultimately require a three year presentation, being phased-in over a 
longer time period so companies will not be required to restate historical data.  71 Fed. Reg., at 6583. 
23 SEC Press Release, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-10.htm (last visited January 27, 
2006); Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6543-45, 6551 (summarizing the regulations). 
24 SEC Press Release, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-10.htm (last visited January 27, 
2006); Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542, 6544, 6571-73.  There has been controversy over the 
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Chairman Cox commented that it is not the government’s “job” to determine the 
appropriate level of executive compensation.25 Rather, it is the role of the shareholders 
and the board of directors.26 The SEC’s primary initiative is aimed at full disclosure of 
all issues that affect compensation decisions.  Although the SEC initially requested 
comments to be completed by April, 2006, the SEC extended the comment period in this 
case.27 After closing the comment period, the SEC will consider and respond to material 
comments28 received before finalizing the Proposed Regulations, such that the revisions 
will not likely be in force until 2007.   
 
Response to the SEC’s NPRM has been overall positive, but with various refinements 
suggested by commentators.29 Some in Congress, however, believe that the NPRM does 
not go far enough and that more comprehensive federal regulation is in order.30 House 
Bill 4291 calls for more substantial reform that would include shareholder votes on 
certain compensation packages.31 Corporations, corporate counsel and company 
advocates, already under siege from shareholder complaints about lucrative compensation 
packages, appear to have taken the NPRM seriously and filed numerous comments 
seeking to lessen the impact of the Proposed Regulations.32 
effectiveness and meaning of independent directors.  See, e.g., Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and 
the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129 (2006). 
25 Cox Speech, supra note 13. 
26 Cox Speech, supra note 13.  Cox commented: “It is their job [the shareholders and directors], not the 
government's, to determine how best to align executive compensation with corporation performance, to 
determine the appropriate levels of executive pay, and to decide on the metrics for determining it.” 
27 Securities and Exchange Commission Website, supra note 15.  As of July 6, 2006, the SEC was still 
receiving comments to the Proposed Regulations. 
28 See generally, e.g., St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Home Box Office, 
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
29 See, e.g., Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(applauding and 
supporting the SEC’s efforts); Comment of Pearl Meyer & Partners, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jrich7010.pdf  
(last visited July 6, 2006)(commending the SEC); Comments of Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/s70306-632.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(expressing strong 
support for the NPRM). 
30 See, Comment of Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006).  See also, 
Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005)(referred to the 
Committee on Financial Services)[hereinafter “Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act”]. 
31 See Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, supra note 26. 
32 See, e.g., Comment of Steve Odland , Business Roundtable, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 
2006); Comment of Christine Richards, Fed Ex Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/fedex041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 
2006); Comment of W. Wayne Withers, Emmerson Electric, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/emerson041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 
2006); Comment of Linda Rappaport and George Spera, Shearman & Sterling, LLP, on behalf of CBS 
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While the SEC was publishing the NPRM, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its 
decision in the case In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (In re Walt 
Disney).33 The Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s decision in favor of the corporate 
defendants and underscored that existing fiduciary duty, good faith and waste theories 
apply equally to the executive compensation arena.34 While SEC Chairman Cox has 
stated that the federal government is not in the business of policing executive 
compensation decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court seems to have declared its intent to 
stay out of the business in any meaningful way as well. 
 
The position of the SEC and the result of In re Walt Disney raise issues regarding 
gatekeeping of executive compensation matters.  If the SEC’s rules will only mandate 
disclosure, does state law provide an alternative means by which the shareholders can 
meaningfully challenge executive compensation approved by the board of directors?  As 
evidenced by In re Walt Disney, shareholders face a difficult task in challenging the 
decisions of the board of directors regarding compensation packages if made in good 
faith and with reasonable information.  Will the Proposed Regulations result in 
substantial change in compensation practices?   
 
This Article will critically evaluate the proposed rulemaking on executive compensation 
announced on January 17, 2006 by SEC Chairman Cox.   The Article takes a look at the 
limits of disclosure as a mechanism to police executive compensation packages.  The 
Article will focus on the SEC’s assertion that previous rules are simply out of date, 
justifying mere updating, rather than comprehensive overhaul.  The SEC has stated that is 
focusing on information disclosure (wage information, not wage controls).  The Article 
outlines the issue of accountability to shareholders even in the face of disclosure.  It 
presents additional alternatives to the method chosen by the SEC.  The Article concludes 
that while the Proposed Regulations will require the disclosure of more executive 
compensation data, the importance of which cannot be understated, beyond that the rules 
won’t give shareholders any additional options to address concerns.  The Proposed 
Regulations are only a piece of the executive compensation picture as they do not provide 
for real and meaningful accountability to shareholders 
 
Part II focuses on federal and state jurisdiction for, and regulation of, executive 
compensation decisions.  The SEC maintains that its jurisdiction over executive 
compensation is limited to information disclosure.  The SEC argues that the board and 
shareholders are vested with actual decision-making authority over such matters, 
presumably under state corporate law.  Even if true, the SEC has failed to highlight the 
gap existing between where the SEC has asserted authority over executive compensation 
disclosure and the limited shareholder powers actually existing under state law, as 
 
Corporation, The Walt Disney Company, NBC Universal (a majority-owned subsidiary of General 
Electric Company), News Corporation, and Viacom Inc., Securities and Exchange Commission Website, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/shearmansterling041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 
2006). 
33 In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.   
34 Id. 
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evidenced by In re Walt Disney. Broad protections exist under state law for board 
decisions (including those on compensation matters) that will be unaffected by the SEC’s 
Proposed Regulations.   
 
Part III looks at the benefits of the SEC’s Proposed Regulations in terms of increased 
information disclosure on a wide variety of compensation topics, including the the crucial 
areas of perquisites and retirement and severance packages.  Part IV canvasses some of 
the apparently unanticipated consequences of this dual federal and state regulation of 
executive compensation, focusing on the reasons why the Proposed Regulations will not 
fix the problem of excessive compensation.  Finally, Part V addresses the relative 
strengths of some of the various alternatives available to the federal and state 
governments to address the gap in regulation, particularly with regard to federal 
intervention, allowing shareholder referendums on executive compensation matters, 
increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis directors and the issues raised by self regulation.   
Ultimately, this Article concludes that while the SEC’s Proposed Regulations represent 
an important first step toward reform in the area of disclosure of executive compensation 
data, not much will change for the investing public.  Additional action by the state or 
federal governments would be needed if we really want to empower shareholder choice.   
 
II.  Jurisdiction for and Regulation of  Executive Compensation    
 
A. The SEC and its Rulemaking Authority     
 
The authority of the SEC has traditionally centered on the disclosure requirements of the 
1933 Securities Act (1933 Act)35 and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (Exchange 
Act).36 Nevertheless, the SEC has on occasion been accused of creativity in construing 
its own jurisdiction to regulate.37 As far back as the 1960’s, the SEC began to take an 
expanded view of its jurisdiction beyond traditional disclosure by  bringing cases aimed 
at protecting the public against “fraud” generally.38 In general, courts have shown 
substantial deference to the interpretation by a federal agency of its own statutory 
authority.39 This deference with respect to the SEC has not been unlimited and the 
 
35 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).  Felix Frankfurter promoted the 1933 Act as able "[t]o 
build on self discipline by all agencies engaged in marketing securities by compelling full publicity of 
'every essentially important element attending the issue of new securities' so that the public may have an 
opportunity to understand what it buys" Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Security Act, FORTUNE, Aug. 
1933, at 53. See also, Roberta Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution 40-41 (1982). 
36 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988). 
37 See, e.g., Philip Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act: Where 
Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. Corp. L. 311 (1992); Lacey and 
George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 JTLP 119 (1998). 
38 See, In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
39 See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 813-15 (1995); 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992); Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-making in Reviewing Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-103 (1994). 
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Supreme Court concluded in Santa Fe v. Green40 that federal securities laws do not 
"federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions 
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would 
be overridden."41 
Today, Chairman Cox describes the SEC’s mission as follows: “to protect investors; to
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and to facilitate capital formation.’’42 Believing
that ‘‘[a]n educated investing public ultimately provides the best defense against fraud and
costly mistakes,’’ the SEC has primarily focused its regulatory reach on requiring companies
to disclose extensive information for review by the SEC and the public and on general public
education programs.43
The SEC adopted the Existing Regulations in 1992, which focus on disclosure and use a 
series of formatted tables capturing compensation data over several years.44 The SEC has 
itself criticized  the tables as “highly formatted and rigid.”45 The Existing Regulations 
include a Performance Graph and Compensation Committee Report relaying in a detailed 
manner compensation and corporate performance, as reflected by stock price.46 The SEC 
has criticized the Compensation Committee Report as leading to boilerplate discussion 
and the Performance Graph as “outdated.”47 The Compensation Committee Report has 
been furnished to, rather than filed with, the SEC by the compensation committee of a 
company, such that Exchange Act liability for misstatements does not attach.48 The SEC 
believed that furnishing the data would help spur more open and robust conversation on 
executive compensation.49 
The SEC does not venture beyond the current disclosure regulatory approach with the 
Proposed Regulations.  The SEC has some rulemaking authority concerning executive 
compensation as part of its fraud protection mandate, and, in fact, has regulated 
disclosure of executive compensation for some time.50 The SEC's specific jurisdiction to 
 
40 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
41 Id. at 479.  For a discussion of the SEC’s attempts to regulate corporate governance matters, see Roberta 
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes 
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 79, at 86-87 (2005)[hereinafter, Karmel, Realizing 
the Dream].  See also, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (SEC rule on voting 
power exceeded authority under the Exchange Act). 
42 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 2, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml  (last visited July 10, 2006). 
43 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 5, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml  (last visited July 10, 2006). 
44 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33–6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48125 (Oct. 16, 1992) 
(hereinafter the ‘‘1992 Release’’). 
45 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6545. 
46 1992 Release, supra note 40. 
47 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547. 
48 1992 Release, supra note 40. 
49 1992 Release, supra note 40, at Section II.H. 
50The SEC first regulated executive compensation disclosure in 1938.  Release No. 34–1823 (Aug. 11, 
1938). In one recent enforcement action, the SEC reached a settlement with Tyson Foods and its former 
CEO, Donald Tyson, with Tyson Foods paying a penalty of $1.5 million and Donald Tyson paying a 
$700,000 penalty for misleading disclosures of compensation information.  U.S. Securities and Exchange 
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regulate disclosure of executive compensation generally lies in the 1933 Act and the 
Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.51 By continuing 
the longstanding disclosure approach to executive compensation, the SEC is remaining 
consistent with its stated mission and tradition.  
 
By failing to go farther with executive compensation, and seeking congressional authority 
as needed, however, the SEC may be using its regulatory authority over disclosure 
matters to accomplish very little.  If one accepts the SEC’s conclusion that it is limited to 
disclosure in the area of executive compensation, do states have remaining jurisdiction 
over executive compensation?  If so, to what extent has this authority been exercised?  
These questions are taken up below. 
 
B. Shareholder Rights Under State Law 
 
The Proposed Regulations must be considered in the context of state regulation of 
executive compensation as well, since there is overlapping jurisdiction regarding 
regulation of compensation matters.  In practice, the most important affirmative initiative 
available under state law to shareholders objecting to executive compensation is suing the 
individual members of the board of directors.52 In general, the board  is vested with the 
authority to manage the corporation with the business judgment rule protecting decision-
making.53 The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized, though, that the core of a 
board’s protection under the business judgment rule requires informed decision making. 
54 “[A] director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a 
duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”55 Gross negligence is the standard 
for determining whether decision-making was informed for purposes of the business 
judgment rule.56 
Commission, 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, at 7, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml  (last visited July 10, 2006). 
51 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6598.  The SEC cited authority 
under “Sections 3(b), 6, 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act, as amended, Sections 10(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d) 
and 23(a) of the Exchange Act, as amended, and Sections 8, 20(a), 24(a), 30 and 38 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as amended.” 
52 See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466.  See, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to 
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 571(examining 124 cases where shareholders 
have brought claims of excessive compensation and concluding that shareholders are more likely to find 
success against smaller corporations when litigating outside of Delaware). 
53 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom,  488 A.2d 858, 872 (DE. 1985). 
54 Id. at 872-73. 
55 Id. at 872-73. 
56 Id. at 873.  While Delaware courts have not precisely defined gross negligence, it is more than simple 
negligence.  See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DE. 1984) (“predicated upon concepts of 
gross negligence”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (DE. 1971), rev'g, 261 A.2d 911 (DE 
Ch.1969) ("fraud or gross overreaching"); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (DE. 1970), 
rev'g, 255 A.2d 717 (DE. Ch. 1969) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 
487, 492-93 (DE. 1966) ("bad faith ... or a gross abuse of discretion"); Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 
749, 750 (DE. 1963) ("fraud or gross abuse of discretion"); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 
351 (DE. Ch. 1972) ("directors may breach their fiduciary duty ... by being grossly negligent"); Kors v. 
Carey, Del.Ch., 158 A.2d 136, 140 (1960) ("fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion"); Allaun v. 
Consolidated Oil Co., Del.Ch., 147 A. 257, 261 (1929) ("reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard 
of the stockholders").  Additionally, the burden of proof is on the party challenging the board’s decision to 
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Furthermore, the duty of care inquiry focuses on process only.  The Delaware Supreme 
Court has observed that substantive due care:  
 
is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or 
quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are 
reasonable in this context.  Due care in the decision-making context is 
process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business 
judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste 
test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, 
which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.57 
Accordingly, shareholder claims against the board of directors often center on satisfaction 
of the board’s procedural duty of care in the decision-making process, though litigation 
often also includes claims of lack of good faith and waste.   
 
1. Delaware Developments Regarding the Duty of Care 
 
Rulings of the Delaware Supreme Court outline a board’s duty of care and have been the 
subject of extensive commentary.  Delaware cases, in particular Smith v. Van Gorkom,58 
create a murky picture of a board’s responsibility of informed decision-making versus the 
shareholders right to challenge board decisions.59 This article will not undertake an in-
depth review of Smith v. Van Gorkom, as extensive consideration of this case has been 
provided by others.60 
To counter the Van Gorkom imposition of personal liability on board members, the 
Delaware General Assembly acted swiftly to limit its effect on other corporations by 
enacting Delaware Code § 102(b)(7).61 Section 102(b)(7) permits corporations to include 
in the certificate of incorporation a provision to exculpate board members from personal 
liability for breaches of duty of care, though not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith 
 
establish facts rebutting the presumption of informed decision-making under the business judgment rule.  
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DE. 1984). 
57 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.2000). 
58 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 898-99 (Del. 1985).  The shareholders’ claim against the board in 
the case arose in the context of the board’s decision for a cash out merger of Trans Union into a new 
corporation. After little negotiations and a scant two hour meeting, the Trans Union board approved merger 
with a new company formed by Pritzker for $55 per share.  Id. at 868-69. 
59 Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a).  
60 See, e.g., The Smith v. Van Gorkom Symposium, 45 Washburn L. J. 267 (2006);  Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 477 (2000) and Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 595 
(2002); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 
Bus. Law. 1, 1 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. 
Law. 1437, 1455 (1985); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of 
Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 583 
(2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision-making in Corporate Governance, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 54 (2002). 
61 65 Del. Laws, c. 289 (1986). 
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violations and certain other violations.62 Many Delaware corporations responded by 
adopting charter provisions containing such exculpatory language.63 
Section 102(b)(7) is important for two primary reasons.  First, the widespread approval of 
Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions by shareholders is a strong indicator that 
shareholders will tolerate a certain amount of risk taking by directors and believe that it 
should not create personal liability.64 Second, it precludes exculpation of directors who 
self deal or do not act in good faith, representing legislative intolerance of directors who 
breach the basic trust given by the shareholders.65 
Despite apparent legislative intention to put the issue to rest, section 102(b)(7) did not 
resolve all questions regarding director liability for breaches of the duty of care even for 
corporations enacting the exculpatory charter provisions.  With regard to cases alleging 
only a duty of care violation, Delaware courts have consistently upheld the effectiveness 
of section 102(b)(7) provisions when litigated and dismiss cases once the defense is 
raised.66 On the other hand, even in the context of a corporation with a section 102(b)(7) 
charter provision, shareholders can plead causes of action alleging board breaches of the 
duty of care that also involve the duty of loyalty or good faith.  These cases survive a 
motion to dismiss and are allowed to proceed to trial. 
 
A duty of loyalty claim would invoke the higher standard of review of fairness.67 The 
Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the fairness analysis cannot be avoided by a 
motion to dismiss even where a Section 102(b)(7) provision applies because “[t]he 
category of transactions that require judicial review pursuant to the entire fairness 
standard ab initio do so because, by definition, the inherently interested nature of those 
transactions are inextricably intertwined with issues of loyalty.”68 Where the 
shareholders allege a duty of loyalty claim, section 102(b)(7) exculpates the board from a 
finding of liability only if the transaction is found to be unfair and the unfairness was 
exclusively due to a breach of the duty of care.69 The cases that are beyond the 
exculpatory reach of section 102(b)(7) highlight the remaining questions regarding board 
liability when faced with shareholder claims involving both the duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty. 
 
62 8 Del C. § 102(b)(7). 
63 Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); see E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for 
Judicial Decision-making in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 693-94 (1998);  see also E. Norman 
Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification 
and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401-04 (1987). 
64 Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decision-making in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. at 693-
94.
65 Id. at 694. 
66 See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, Del.Supr., 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 
A.2d 85, 91 (2001); Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del.Supr., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (1996); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. 
Bancorp., Inc., Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1270, 1288 (1994). 
67 See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 144 (“The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is 
authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.”).  See also,
Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094 (“entire fairness”). 
68 Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 93. 
69 Emerald Partners, 787 S.2d at 98. 
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2. In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court did not revisit directly the questions left open by Van 
Gorkom and Section 102(b)(7) until more than twenty years later.70 In June 2006, the 
Court provided some clarification of the application of the duty of care, as well as good 
faith and waste, when it decided In re Walt Disney.71 In re Walt Disney Co. considered 
the actions of the board of the Walt Disney Company (Disney) in entering into an 
employment agreement with Michael Ovitz (Ovitz) as President.  The agreement resulted 
in the payment to Ovitz of a $130 million severance package when he was dismissed 
after just fourteen months of service.72 Michael Eisner (Eisner), was the company’s 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and also had a social relationship with Ovitz.  
Eisner, along with Irwin Russell, a director and the Chairman of the Compensation 
Committee, approached Ovitz about joining Disney.73 
The Ovitz employment agreement (OEA) was modeled after other employment 
agreements Disney had used previously.  The OEA contained no fault termination 
provisions with a significant severance package (NFT) in the event that Ovitz was 
terminated for anything other than gross negligence or malfeasance.74 Prior to 
concluding the OEA, Disney hired Graef Crystal, an executive compensation consultant. 
Raymond Watson, another member of the compensation committee, worked with Crystal 
to evaluate the OEA.75 The Disney compensation committee met at some point later and 
approved the terms of the OEA, after reviewing the term sheet, presentations by Watson 
and Russell and discussion.76 Later that same day, the full Disney board met, and after 
discussion and deliberations, elected Ovitz as President.77 When Ovitz was not as 
successful as Disney desired, the relationship deteriorated.  Ovitz was dismissed without 
formal board action a mere fourteen months later under the NFT provisions of the OEA, 
as there was no cause to dismiss.78 In reaction, the shareholders brought a derivative suit 
against Ovitz and the board.79 
70 While during this period the Delaware Supreme Court did not decide any cases directly involving a 
board’s duty of care (and none involving compensation issues), it did decide several cases that raised duty 
of loyalty issues and the overlap with section 102(b)(7).  See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, Del.Supr., 780 
A.2d 1075, 1095 (2001); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (2001); Zirn v. VLI Corp., Del.Supr., 
681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (1996); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1270, 1288 
(1994).  In Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (2001), the Court overturned the Chancery Court 
judgment in favor of the board defendants based on the corporate charter’s exculpatory clause. The Court 
characterized the shareholder’s claim regarding the merger price as properly pleading an entire fairness 
claim.  Id. at 88.  The Court rejected the board’s argument that it was protected from even entire fairness 
failures under section 102(b)(7).  Id.
71 __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466.   
72 Id. at 1. 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id. at 3. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. at 5. 
77 Id. at 6. 
78 Id. at 8-9. 
79 Id. at 1.  The suit was brought in January 1997 by several shareholders alleging breaches of fiduciary 
duty and contract and waste of assets.  Id. The litigation was extended and involved several pretrial 
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In a lengthy opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court tackled the intersection between the 
business judgment rule and Section 102(b)(7).80 The court stressed that the presumption 
of the business judgment rule can be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the directors 
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.”81 In such cases, 
according to the Court, “the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate 
that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”82 Because no duty of loyalty breach was claimed against the directors, the 
only way to rebut the business judgment rule, according to the Court, was to “show that 
the Disney defendants had either breached their duty of care or had not acted in good 
faith.”83 Moreover, building upon its holding in Emerald Partners v. Berlin,84 the Court 
explained that an examination of a board’s lack of good faith can be made: (1) for 
purposes of rebutting the business judgment rule; and (2) if the board is found liable, for 
purposes of exculpation under section 102(b)(7).85 
This section will not review in detail every claim that the shareholders made on appeal.  
It will look closer at three specific areas that the Court grappled with and that are likely to 
impact the treatment of executive compensation decisions in the future. One category 
focuses on the reach of In re Walt Disney’s concept of the duty of care and how a 
corporation can insulate itself from complaints under that basis.  A second category 
involves good faith as an element to avoid exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) and as a 
grounds to rebut the business judgment rule in general.  In this category, the key question 
is whether the board’s decision-making regarding the executive compensation package 
involved intentionally bad conduct or a “conscious[ ] and intentional[ ] disregard[ ][of] 
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don't care about the risks' attitude,” 86 which would result 
in a finding of bad faith, or, alternatively, whether gross negligence, which was found not 
to be lacking in good faith. The third category focuses on complaints of excessive 
compensation packages, like In re Walt Disney, as waste, where the payments at issue are 
related to rational business attempts to attract executive talent.   
 
a. Executive Compensation as a Duty of Care Element 
After Section 102(b)(7) 
 
The board of Trans Union in Van Gorkom made a decision to merge the company at a 
 
motions and an earlier appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.  Id.  See, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 
(Del.2000)(allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint). The trial lasted 37 days and resulted in a 174 
page opinion by the Chancellor concluding that  "the director defendants did not breach their fiduciary 
duties or commit waste." In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 20566651, at 1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005); --- A.2d ---- (Del.2005).  The plaintiffs appealed from this judgment, claiming 
numerous errors.  __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 1562466, at 1.   
80 Id. at 15. 
81 Id. at 15. 
82 Id. at 15. 
83 Id. at 15. 
84 787 A.2d 85. 
85 2006 WL 1562466, at 15.  The business judgment rule can be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the 
directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.” Id. (italics added). 
86 2006 WL 1562466, at 24, 26, quoting 2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.). 
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hastily called, brief board meeting with no formal documents or presentations.  In doing 
so, the board in Van Gorkom acted short of fulfilling its duty of care to act with informed 
decision-making.87 Section 102(b)(7) was intended to limit the duty of care analysis 
primarily to cases where there were also allegations of bad faith.  Later cases, like 
Emerald Partners, considered board decisions that also implicated duty of loyalty claims, 
also not exculpable section 102(b)(7).88 Neither Van Gorkom nor Emerald Partners dealt 
with the  issue of shareholder allegations that a board acted without due care and in bad 
faith in the absence of a duty of loyalty claim.  By contrast, the In re Walt Disney Court 
struggled with how to apply the duty of care analysis to board and committee decision-
making in a compensation matter where shareholders alleged bad faith and the 
corporation had a Section 102(b)(7) exculptatory provision.   
 
It is important to note that general circumstances of In re Walt Disney are distinguishable 
from Van Gorkom on a number of grounds. The Trans Union board’s decision to enter 
into a merger agreement required board approval under Delaware statute.89 No decision 
of the full Disney board of the OEA was required by statute.  Furthermore, the board’s 
decision-making authority was actually delegated to the compensation committee.90 
Moreover, the court in Van Gorkom evaluated the action of the Trans Union board as a 
collective group, whereas the action of the Disney directors was considered 
individually.91 The decision of the Trans Union board concerned a merger, one of the 
most important occurrences in the life of a corporation.92 In re Walt Disney concerned 
an executive compensation matter.   
 
Similarly the specific facts of In re Walt Disney are also distinguishable from Van 
Gorkom in terms of the informed decision-making of: (1) the compensation committee 
and board concerning the OEA; and (2) the board’s hiring Ovitz as President.  Regarding 
the compensation committee, although the Disney compensation committee did not have 
a copy of the OEA when approved, the committee had a “term sheet” describing the NFT 
provisions, which was attached to the meeting minutes.93 Furthermore, the committee 
members were apprised of the potential value of the NFT.94 The committee reviewed 
various spreadsheets that highlighted the “benchmarking” of the Ovitz options to prior 
options the compensation committee had approved for other executives in order to give 
the members a fair idea of the value in the event of NFT.95 The committee was also well 
aware of the “downside” protection of $150 to $200 million that Ovitz was demanding 
before leaving his company.96 Moreover, the committee’s failure to specifically discuss 
the gross negligence and malfeasance event triggers of the NFT was not concerning 
because “those terms ‘were not foreign to the board of directors, as the language was 
 
87 488 A.2d 858. 
88 787 A.2d 85, 93. 
89 See 8 Del. C. § 251(b). 
90 2006 WL 1562466, at 16. 
91 Id. at 17. 
92 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867. 
93 2006 WL 1562466, at 18-19. 
94 Id. at 19. 
95 Id. at 19. 
96 Id. at 20. 
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standard, and could be found, for example, in Eisner's, Wells', Katzenberg's and Roth's 
employment contracts.’”97 Finally, although the expert consultant was not present at the 
compensation committee meeting, Crystal had worked on similar Disney agreements 
before, met with some of the committee members prior to the meeting and was available 
by telephone to answer questions.98 Only after receiving the information and 
presentations and deliberating on the matter, did the compensation committee approve the 
terms of the OEA. 
 
While the deliberations of the Disney compensation committee fell short of “best 
practices,”99 the deliberation process of the Trans Union board stands in sharp contrast.  
In Van Gorkom, the meeting was called on short notice and there was no documentary 
information for the Trans Union board to consider and little in terms of presentations.100 
The management of Trans Union was opposed to the merger.101 After board approval of 
the merger agreement, Van Gorkom revised the agreement in a manner inconsistent with 
the board’s authorization.102 Finally, the Trans Union board did not have expert reports 
that it could rely on and engaged in little deliberations.   
 
Moreover, the facts surrounding the actions of the full board in the hiring of Ovitz as 
President are also distinguishable from Van Gorkom.  The Disney board had spent 
substantial time over a course of several years debating the hiring of a new President and 
the potential candidates, including Ovitz.103 The board was also aware that hiring Ovitz 
would result in him leaving a highly successful company and that the market reacted 
positively to Disney’s announcement that Ovitz would come to work with them.104 
Finally, the board was aware of the compensation committee’s approval of the OEA and 
received presentations regarding its terms.105 
These distinctions make it possible to conclude that Van Gorkom and In re Walt Disney 
are not inconsistent with each other. The Delaware Supreme Court did not rely 
specifically on these distinctions, however, in writing its opinion and did not even cite 
Van Gorkom.106 The main theme stressed was the requirement that a decision maker 
become informed of material information reasonably available, not necessarily being 
privy to all conversations and documents.107 Further, the Disney board members were 
protected under 8 Del. C. § 141(e) for good faith reliance on the professional report 
prepared by the compensation consultant, Crystal.108 While the Court generally 
 
97 Id. at 20 (citing 2005 WL 2056651 at 9 n. 81). 
98 2006 WL 1562466, at  21. 
99 Id. at 19-20. 
100 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-78. 
101 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867-68. 
102 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883-84. 
103 Id. at 22. 
104 Id. at 21-22. 
105 Id. at 23. 
106 While the Supreme Court did not cite Van Gorkom, the Delaware Chancery Court decision that the 
Court affirmed cited Van Gorkom more than twenty times and specifically drew upon the distinctions 
between the cases.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch.). 
107 2006 WL 1562466, at 21-22. 
108 Id. at 21. 
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distinguished the type of informed board decision-making made by the Disney 
compensation committee and board, it did not specifically rely on any of the other factual 
distinctions between the two cases. Moreover, the theme of gross negligence strongly 
emphasized in Van Gorkom was seemingly replaced by one that best practices are not 
mandated to ensure business judgment rule protections. 
 
In upholding the Court of Chancery’s decision on the due care issue in favor of the board 
members and Ovitz actions concerning the OEA, the Court characterized the actions of 
the Disney compensation committee as failing “best practices” from an informed 
decision-making standpoint.  A simple failure to exercise best practices is not below the 
requisite exercise of due care, in contrast to the type of decision-making in Van 
Gorkom.109 The true issue to be resolved, according to the Court, was whether the 
compensation committee, when approving the OEA, and board, when appointing Ovitz as 
President, were “were fully informed of all material facts.” 110 Yet, the court still retained 
the general rule that board members should not be liable for due care errors in in the 
absence of gross negligence.111 
In re Walt Disney Co. raises the question of the reach of the gross negligence standard for 
due care in the executive compensation context.  How close to best practices must 
compensation committees come? If courts define the due care obligation broadly, 
executive compensation and employment decisions appear to require the same type of 
information gathering, expert hiring and other processes used in more complicated 
transactions, such as mergers.  This seems particularly onerous in the differing contexts 
of the life of a corporate enterprise.  While in Van Gorkom, the board’s decision-making 
related to a cash out merger that would end the life of Trans Union, no similar magnitude 
of decision-making exists in the executive compensation arena of In re Walt Disney.  
Despite the passage of section 102(b)(7), the Court’s extensive consideration of due care 
obligations suggests that these obligations are alive and well.  So, what is role of section 
102(b)(7)? 
 
b. The Emergence of a Good Faith Element   
 
Much of the initial portion of the Court’s In re Walt Disney decision works over the due 
care analysis in the executive compensation context.  Disney, however, had a Section 
102(b)(7) exculpation clause in its charter documents.  Therefore, even if the plaintiffs 
had prevailed on an informed decision-making claim, it would not be enough to impose 
liability.  To get around the section 102(b)(7) exculpation, the shareholders claimed the 
compensation committee and board acted in bad faith.   Much has been written about the 
duty of good faith requirement arising under section 102(b)(7) prior to the decision In re 
Walt Disney, but this was truly the Court’s opportunity to provide some guidance.112 
109 2006 WL 1562466, at 18-19. 
110 Id. at 22-23. 
111 Id. at 17, 22. 
112 For articles concerning the Disney litigation, see, e.g., Robert Baker, In Re Walt Disney: What It Means 
To The Definition Of Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. 
ST. U. BUS. REV. 261 (2004-2005); Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith In Director 
Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready To Force Corporate Directors To Go Out-Of-Pocket After Disney 
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The efforts of the Court to clarify good faith under section 102(b)(7) are in the end 
probably more confusing than illuminating without a clear factual application illustrating 
bad faith.  Most importantly, the Court emphasized that the duty of care and duty of good 
faith were separate.  Thus, the shareholders’ “effort to collapse the duty to act in good 
faith into the duty to act with due care, is not unlike putting a rabbit into the proverbial 
hat and then blaming the trial judge for making the insertion.”113 As the Court had 
already concluded that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their duty of care arguments, 
treating good faith in the same manner would not have changed the outcome on these 
facts.114 The Court’s analysis could have ended here.   
 
Nevertheless, the Court decided to address plaintiffs legal claims regarding good faith in 
order to provide “some conceptual guidance to the corporate community.”115 The Court 
classified corporate behavior as involving three categories of behaviors that could be 
considered  in the bad faith analysis.116 First, “subjective bad faith” where there is an 
actual intent to harm that is shown to have occurred.117 This conduct would certainly 
constitute bad faith for purposes of section 102(b)(7).  Second, conduct that is simply a 
lack of due care, gross negligence.118 This conduct, without more, would not constitute 
bad faith for purposes of section 102(b)(7).  To conclude otherwise, would eviscerate the 
purpose of the statute.119 The third category of conduct is that which falls between the 
first two.  “[S]uch misconduct is properly treated as a non-exculpable, non-indemnifiable 
 
IV?, 83 DENV. U.L.REV. 531 (2005).  For a general discussion of the good faith exception to exculpation, 
see, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L.REV. 456 (2004); Matthew R. Berry, 
Does Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal Liability? Only if Delaware 
Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L.REV.. 1125 (2004); John L. Reed and Matt Neiderman, Good 
Faith and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Law as a Defense to 
Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary 
Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business 
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (Hereinafter 
“Griffith”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 
(2005); Filippo Rossi, Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court's Triad of Fiduciary Duties (June 22, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755784 (last visited July 18, 2006); Christopher M. Bruner, 
“Good Faith,” State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832944 (last visited 
July 19, 2006); Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism Threatening the 
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW, 1 (2005) 
113 2006 WL 1562466, at 24. 
114 Id. at 24. 
115 Id. at 24 (italics supplied). 
116 Id. at 25. 
117 Id. at 25. 
118 Id. at 25. 
119 Id. at 25-26.  The Court also concluded that the Delaware indemnification statute also supported a 
differentiation between the failures of the duty of care and those of good faith.  See 8 Del. C. § 145. The 
statute allows for indemnification in proceedings where the person “acted in good faith and in a manner the 
person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation . . . .” 8 Del. C. 
§§ 145(a) & (b). Since “a director or officer of a corporation can be indemnified for liability (and litigation 
expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not for a violation of the duty to act in 
good faith” the two inquiries must be different.  2006 WL 1562466, at 26. 
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violation of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”120 
The Court included in this category of bad faith the conduct described in the Delaware 
Chancery Court opinion as  a “conscious[ ] and intentional[ ] disregard[ ][of] 
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don't care about the risks' attitude  . . . .” 121 Quite 
naturally, the duty of good faith should “protect the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders” from conduct that “does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) 
but is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence . . . .”122 Furthermore, section 
102(b)(7) itself distinguishes misconduct that is intentional from conduct that is not in 
good faith, though both are non-exculpable.123 
Questions about good faith remain unaddressed in the wake of the Court's decision. The 
holding places deliberate bad intent by corporate boards and grossly negligent conduct at 
the opposite ends of the good faith continuum.  On the other hand, the Court gives limited 
guidance of where on that continuum specific types of board behavior fall.  For instance, 
behavior that may involve the exact type of risk taking expected by shareholders.  If there 
is a potential that courts will classified this behavior as bad faith, boards may become risk 
averse to the detriment of shareholders. Further, the Court specifically did not determine 
the limits of the final category of fiduciary conduct.  “To engage in an effort to craft . . .  
‘a definitive and categorical definition of the universe of acts that would constitute bad 
faith’ would be unwise . . . .”124 Most importantly, the Court did not “reach or otherwise 
address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty that, like the 
duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent basis for imposing liability upon 
corporate officers and directors.” 125 The Court left open that allegations of bad faith 
could be a separate claim against boards and committees, such as the compensation 
committee that approved the OEA.126 These questions and others that remain unresolved 
in the wake of In re Walt Disney. It has been left to the lower courts to struggle with 
some of these issues regarding application of the duty of care and good faith analysis. 
 
c. Executive Compensation as Waste   
 
120 2006 WL 1562466, at 26. 
121 2006 WL 1562466, at 24, 26, quoting 2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.). 
122 2006 WL 1562466, at 26.  The Chancellor had described the relation of the types of fiduciary conduct: 
 
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care 
and loyalty, in the narrow sense that I have discussed them above, but all actions required 
by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary 
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or 
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other examples of bad 
faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most salient. 
 
2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.)(footnotes deleted). 
123 2006 WL 1562466, at 27. 
124 2006 WL 1562466, at 27, quoting 2005 WL 2056651, at 36 (Del. Ch.). 
125 2006 WL 1562466, at 27 n.112. 
126 2006 WL 1562466, at 27 n.112. 
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The third category of cases where executive compensation packages may be actionable 
arises where board or committee decision-making may not involve a lack of informed 
decision-making, but the payment to the executive nevertheless constitutes waste.  The 
Court of Chancery dismissed the shareholders’ waste claim initially. 127 The Delaware 
Supreme Court  allowed the shareholders to amend the complaint, but emphasized that 
“waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately 
small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to 
trade.”128 In fact, “[i]t is the essence of business judgment for a board to determine if “a 
‘particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money, whether in the form of current 
salary or severance provisions.’ ” 129 The clear conclusion to be drawn from the Court is 
that it is assuming the board’s authority over the decision-making is broadly protected by 
the business judgment rule unless there is no “rational business purpose” for the 
decision.130 To overcome this inference, a proper challenge to payments to an executive 
such as Ovitz would be “whether the amounts required to be paid in the event of an NFT 
were wasteful ex ante;” either the payment was not required by contract with the 
executive at all or was wasteful when entered into by the company.131 
In re Walt Disney involves a fact pattern demonstrating that corporate boards have wide 
discretion in making large executive compensation payments without triggering liability 
for waste.  For instance, at the time the payments were made to Ovitz, Disney was 
contractually obligated to pay Ovitz the NFT payments under the OEA.132 The board, 
therefore, is protected from a waste claim unless the OEA itself was wasteful.133 An 
example of this kind of agreement would have been if the shareholders could have proved 
that the OEA itself “incentivized Ovitz to perform poorly in order to obtain payment of 
the NFT provisions.”134 The OEA, however, was designed to financially incentivize 
Ovitz to leave his prior company and join Disney.135 There was certainly no evidence 
that Ovitz had sought to intentionally get himself fired, a claim the Court rejected as 
“fanciful.”136 Finally, at the time Disney exercised the NFT provisions, the board 
members believed that Disney would be better off without Ovitz, but that termination for 
cause was not an option.137 
In re Walt Disney solidifies the Court’s prior rulings on waste concluding that “[a] claim 
of waste will arise only in the rare, “unconscionable case where directors irrationally 
 
127 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263. 
128 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.  The Delaware Supreme Court has addressed waste in other cases as well.  See,
Sinclair Oil Corp. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.1995); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del.1952). 
129 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 362 (quoting 
Grimes v. Donald, Del.Supr., 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (1996))). 
130 2006 WL 1562466, at 33. 
131 Id., at 33. 
132 Id., at 33. 
133 Id., at 33. 
134 Id., at 33. 
135 Id., at 33. 
136 Id., at 33. 
137 Id., at 33. 
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squander or give away corporate assets.”138 Because of the wide discretion given to 
boards in compensation matters, waste is not likely to be a successful claim for 
shareholders unhappy about a board’s decisions and will not result in much, if any, legal 
oversight over compensation matters. 
 
III.   The Benefits of the SEC’s Disclosure Approach to Executive Compensation 
 
The Proposed Regulations contain extensive provisions designed to improve the SEC's 
ability to ensure that shareholders have a “more complete picture of the compensation 
earned by a company’s principal executive officer, principal financial officer and highest 
paid executive officers and members of its board of directors.”139 The Proposed 
Regulations would not only strengthen the existing disclosure system by expanding the 
format for and types of executive compensation information covered, but also address 
more fully “key financial relationships among companies and their executive officers, 
directors, significant shareholders and their respective immediate family members.”140 
The SEC intends the Proposed Regulations to enhance the strengths of the current 
reporting system, rather than forging ahead in a different direction.141 
Disclosure of executive compensation issues raises complex questions.  What should the 
SEC include in compensation? When was compensation paid to an executive?  How was 
the compensation paid?  How and when should compensation be valued?  How can the 
format of disclosure provide meaningful data that the public can use for comparative 
purposes?  The SEC has attempted to address the breadth of these issues in the Proposed 
Regulations, sometimes with more success and clarity for some items than for others. 
 
A. Compensation Discussion and Analysis Will Explain Compensation Policy 
 
One of the major improvements contained in the Proposed Regulations is the new 
requirement of a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) narrative intended to 
relay “material factors underlying compensation policies and decisions” related to the 
information set forth in the required tables.142 Simplified, the CD&A would give context 
to the tabular disclosure and explain material elements of the company’s compensation 
relative to the named executives, including: (1) the objectives of the compensation 
program; (2) the actions the company rewards through the compensation program; (3) the 
individual elements included in the compensation program; (4) the rationale supporting 
particular elements of the compensation program; (5) the reasoning behind the amounts 
chosen for each element; and (6) how the choices surrounding the elements fit with the 
 
138 Id., at 33 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263). 
139 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542. 
140 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6542. 
141 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6543. 
142 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6544-6547.  See also, Jeffrey Gordon, Executive Compensation: 
If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. 
CORP. L. 675, 702 (2005)(arguing for a CD&A signed by the compensation committee members and 
submitted to the shareholders for approval). 
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compensation objectives as a whole.143 The SEC intends the CD&A not to be a 
“boilerplate” discussion. 144 For this reason, compliance with the Proposed Regulations 
could have a substantial impact on companies by requiring them for the first time to set 
out compensation policies in a detailed manner. 
 
B. Compensation Tables Will Provide Important Disclosure of Perquisites and 
Stealth Retirement Compensation 
 
Along with the CD&A, the revisions to the compensation tables are significant in terms 
of the amount of disclosure that will be made to the public.145 The compensation tables 
themselves would include expanded disclosure for: (1) executive compensation for the 
last fiscal year, including deferred compensation; (2) equity related interests relating to 
compensation; and (3) retirement and post employment compensation and benefits.146 
The revisions are intended to provide more clarity to the presentation by organizing 
disclosure around “themes,” while confirming that companies must disclose all elements 
of executive compensation.147 For instance, the Summary Compensation Table 
contemplated by the Proposed Regulations requires companies to disclose compensation 
of named executive officers for the last three years, 148 including a total compensation 
 
143 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6545.  For instance, a company would include in its CD&A 
discussion of the policies underlying decisions to allocate compensation between current and long-term 
compensation; allocating payments between cash and non-cash compensation, such as stock and stock 
options; regarding benchmarking of executive compensation packages; and regarding the involvement of 
executives in the compensation process. Id. at 6546. 
144 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6546. 
145 Among other things, the Summary Compensation Table contemplated by the Proposed Regulations 
requires companies to disclose compensation of named executive officers for the last three years.  Proposed 
Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547-48.  A narrative discussion would follow the table to disclose material 
information needed to understand the presentation in the tables.  Id. at 6548.  Additionally, the two 
supplemental tables will break down and explain information from the summary table.  Id. at 6555-57.  See 
also, Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, at 4, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(explaining that the 
“all other compensation” figure may be quite large for some companies and that breakdown is necessary 
for clarity).   
146 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6544, 6547-6568.  The SEC contemplates three tables that work 
together: Summary Compensation Table;  Grants of Performance-Based Awards Table; and Grants of All 
Other Equity Awards Table.  Id. at 6547 n. 63. 
147 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6545.  It had come to the SEC’s attention at some companies 
believed that selected executive compensation figures are not currently required to be disclosed in the 
tables because they do not precisely fit in the existing tabular format.  Id. at 6545 n.51 (citing, The 
Corporate Counsel at 6-7 (Sept.–Oct. 2005); The Corporate Counsel at 7 (Sept.–Oct. 2004); Alan L. Beller, 
Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks Before 
Conference of the NASPP, The Corporate Counsel and the Corporate Executive (October 20, 2004) 
(indicating that the explicit language of the current rules requires disclosure of such items), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102004alb.htm (last visited July 11, 2006)). 
148 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547-48.  A narrative discussion would follow the table to 
disclose material information needed to understand the presentation in the tables.  Id. at 6548.  
Additionally, the two supplemental tables will break down and explain information from the summary 
table, which should provide a better picture of the elements of additional compensation in particular.  Id. at 
6555-57.  See also, Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, at 4, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 
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column intended to require disclosure in a single number of aggregate amounts of 
compensation of all types.149 Moreover, the “all other compensation” column includes a 
number of important disclosure items, including perquisites and personal benefits,150 but 
is limited to avoid disclosure of items that are de minimus (less than $10,000 in the 
aggregate).151 This will discourage companies from using perquisites, retirement 
benefits, lucrative severanace packages and other compensation in a means to avoid 
public disclosure of compensation, what some have termed “stealth compensation.”152 
Finally, the Proposed Regulations also tackle the large amounts corporations pay to 
executives in the form of retirement, or like in the case of Ovitz, post employment 
payments. 153 
2006)(explaining that the “all other compensation” figure may be quite large for some companies and that 
breakdown is necessary for clarity). 
149 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6547-48.   
150 The test for inclusion rests on whether the item is “integrally and directly” related to the executive’s job, 
and would include items “such as use of company-provided aircraft, yachts or other watercraft, commuter 
transportation services, additional clerical or secretarial services devoted to personal matters, or investment 
management services.”  Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6553-54 (detailing numerous examples of 
perquisites requiring disclosure).  This disclosure is on the aggregate incremental cost to the company, 
rather than the market value of such perquisites.  Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6554. But see,
Comment of Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf (last visited  July 12, 2006)(arguing for 
market valuation approach). 
151 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6551.  First, companies will finally be obliged to report an 
executives earnings on non-tax qualified deferred compensation in all cases, rather than just if the earnings 
are above-market or preferential.  Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6552.  But see,, Comment of Steve 
Odland , Business Roundtable, at 4, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf  (last visited July 12, 2006)( arguing that 
this item should not be changed  as market rate earnings simply represent what an executive would earn 
investing the compensation on their own if not deferred).  Second, the disclosure of increases in the 
actuarial value to executives of pension plans may result in disclosure of a significant element of 
compensation.  Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6552; Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, at 4, located at 
Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006); Stealth 
Compensation, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. at 140-41; Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. at 854-56.   Finally, 
companies would be required to disclose perquisites and personal benefits if they aggregate to $10,000 or 
more.  Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6551-54.  This requirement also adds footnote disclosure that 
specifically, rather than generally, identifies the perquisites or personal benefits and requires valuation of 
those valued at greater than $25,000 or ten percent of the perquisites.  Id. at 6553.  But see, Comment of 
Lucian Bebchuk, at 5, located at Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(suggesting that 
companies should also be required to disclose post-retirement perks). 
152 See Comment of Lucian Bebchuk, at 3, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/lbebchuk5984.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006); Stealth 
Compensation, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. at 123-124,128-132; Executive Pensions, 30 J. Corp. L. at 827-832.  
153 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6560-63.  First, companies will disclose estimated annual 
retirement payments that an executive officer is currently entitled to or will become upon eligible for 
retirement under defined benefit plans.  Id. at 6560-61. Second, companies will disclose data regarding 
nonqualified defined contribution and other deferred compensation plans. Id. at 6561.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, companies will now be required to disclose in narrative form arrangements with 
executives for payments in the event of “resignation, severance, retirement or other termination,  . . . a 
change in his or her responsibilities, or a change of control of the company.” Id.  
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C. Other Disclosures and Modifications Will Help Provide a Clearer Picture of 
Executive Compensation Practices 
 
Further, the Proposed Regulations also add new disclosure requirements and strengthen 
some existing disclosure.  First, the Proposed Regulations contemplate compensation 
disclosure for the three most highly compensated employees who earn more than the 
executive officers or directors, but who are not themselves executive officers.154 Second, 
the SEC believes that a table disclosing director compensation in a format similar to the 
Summary Compensation Table for executives is also in order because of the emergence 
of more complicated director compensation packages that often include company stock 
and incentive plans.155 Finally, the Proposed Regulations take the stance that executive 
compensation is also linked to financial transactions between companies and their 
directors and significant shareholders, warranting disclosure.156 
D. Filing of the Disclosure will Create Liability for Misstatements 
 
Importantly, under the current rules, the Compensation Committee “furnishes” to the 
SEC a required “Compensation Committee Report and Performance Graph” which does 
not create potential liability under the 1933 Act or Exchange Act.157 The Report and 
Performance Graph are eliminated under the Proposed Regulations.158 Under the 
Proposed Regulations, the CD&A, tables and accompanying narrative will be considered 
“soliciting material” and will be “filed” with the SEC.159 The effect is that the disclosure 
 
154 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6544.  This requirement has been criticized particularly by those 
companies in the entertainment industry as onerous, an invasion of privacy of entertainers and unrelated to 
decisions relative to executive compensation.  See, e.g., Linda Rappaport and George Spera, Shearman & 
Sterling, LLP, on behalf of CBS Corporation, The Walt Disney Company, NBC Universal (a majority-
owned subsidiary of General Electric Company), News Corporation, and Viacom Inc., at 1-2,  Securities 
and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/shearmansterling041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006); 
Comment of Pearl Meyer & Partners, at 10, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jrich7010.pdf  (last visited July 12, 2006); Comment of Steve 
Odland, Business Roundtable, at 2, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 12, 2006); Comment of 
Dixie Johnson, ABA Section on Business Law, at 32, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/djohnson051506.pdf (last visited July 12, 2006). 
155 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6544, 6564-65.  See also, e.g., National Association of Corporate 
Directors and Pearl Meyer & Partners, 2003–2004 Director Compensation Survey (2004); National 
Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission On Director 
Compensation (2001); Dennis C. Carey, et al. How Should Corporate Directors Be Compensated?, 
Investment Dealers’ Digest Inc. — Special Issue:Boards and Directors (Jan. 1996). 
156 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg., at 6544, 6571-82.  The requirements anticipate companies will 
broadly disclose certain transactions, including indebtedness, with related persons, where the amount 
exceeds $120,000.  Id at 6572.  Furthermore, corporate policies and procedures for related party 
transactions would also be subject to disclosure.  Id. at 6576.  This disclosure will be consolidated with 
other existing disclosure items related to corporate governance, such as a narrative about director 
independence.  Id. at 6545, 6577-78. 
157 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg., at 6544, 6546. 
158 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg., at 6544, 6546-47. 
159 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg., at 6544, 6546. 
THE HOUSE OF MOUSE AND BEYOND   25  
of executive compensation information will be a company report certified by the 
executives, rather than just furnished by the compensation committee of the board.160 
This change would now create liability for misstatements under the Exchange Act for 
every company that is subject to the rules.   
 
The filing of the information will result in more executive involvement in compensation 
matters and particularly how they are disclosed.161 There is no reason to believe, though, 
that executive involvement in this disclosure aspect of compensation matters will affect 
compensation committee decision-making at the time the compensation is approved.  The 
SEC is convinced that company responsibility over the disclosure of board matters as a 
filed item in this instance is the means to ensure full disclosure. 
 
With all this information disclosure, what impact will the Proposed Regulations actually 
have on executive compensation decision-making?  Will the shareholders have remedies 
for excessive executive compensation? 
 
IV. Why the Proposed Regulations Won’t Fix Excessive Compensation: 
Consequences of Dual Regulation 
 
Information disclosure is important and helpful to the investing public.  Finalizing the 
Proposed Regulations alone, though, will not accomplish the task of making corporate 
decision-makers accountable for compensation decisions.  Since its formation, the SEC’s 
mission has been focused on the disclosure of accurate information to the public.  The 
SEC will undoubtedly engage in involved review of information submitted by companies.  
The SEC will not, and has not been, however, in the business of merit-review of 
executive compensation.  Nevertheless, Chairman Cox is hoping “that when people are 
forced to undress in public, they’ll pay more attention to their figures.”162 
The SEC acts as a repository for financial and other data on executive compensation.  
Aside from material misstatements contained in filed information, SEC involvement ends 
after filing.  Sifting through the data will be a task for investors, and particularly, 
institutional investors.  While it may be possible for the investing public to rise to this 
challenge, much depends on whether the public will be motivated and able to curb 
perceived abuses.  SEC disclosure mandates for executive compensation disclosure have 
been in place since 1938.  While in 1940 half of the executives earned fifty-six times the 
average worker’s pay, by 2004 the number increased to one hundred four times the 
 
160 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg., at 6544, 6546. 
161 See, e.g., Comment of Steve Odland, Business Roundtable, at 2, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 12, 
2006); Comment of Dixie Johnson, ABA Section on Business Law, at 4-5 Securities and Exchange 
Commission Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/djohnson051506.pdf (last 
visited July 12, 2006); Comment of Pearl Meyer & Partners, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Website, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jrich7010.pdf  (last visited July 12, 2006). 
162 Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006 at Sec. 3, p. 
1. 
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average worker’s pay.163 If the past is any guide, improved transparency will not operate 
as a check on the amount of executive compensation paid.164 
Even if companies fully report and shareholders receive and are able to understand the 
executive compensation data as more fully disclosed under the Proposed Regulations, 
shareholders still confront serious obstacles.  The SEC only regulates accurate disclosure.  
The rest is left to state law.  Let us assume the Proposed Regulations were in effect when 
the Disney compensation committee approved the OEA.  State law only controls whether 
compensation decisions are made complying with due care procedures for informed 
decision-making, in good faith, and are not wasteful.  Even with the information that the 
Proposed Regulations would have required Disney to disclose to the  shareholders about 
the OEA, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that that the OEA was approved with 
due care, in good faith and was not wasteful.165 This leaves a gap between information 
disclosure and the shareholder’s ability to hold decision-makers accountable for 
compensation packages that the shareholders perceive to be excessive.  Unfortunately, 
the fundamental problem with executive compensation decision-making is not as simple 
as information disclosure.  There are the lingering issues of accountability and 
shareholders’ ability to react to the information.  Is the only goal of the Proposed 
Regulations to provide shareholders information prior to purchasing shares?   
 
The SEC’s focus on expanded disclosure of executive compensation information --
excessive or otherwise-- will undoubtedly have consequences for executive 
compensation.166 Companies may change policies away from certain compensation 
elements that must be disclosed to ones that are more useful and link pay to 
performance.167 Disclosure will not fully address the issues of executive compensation 
for a number of reasons.  First, compensation decisions raise issues of arms-length 
dealing and managerial influence over the compensation process.  Second, shareholders 
desiring to respond to the enhanced information disclosure may find they have little 
recourse beyond selling their shares, which is not always a viable alternative.  Third, the 
ability of shareholders to challenge board decisions on compensation issues directly or by 
removing directors is limited, suggesting that accountability is lacking.  Finally, while 
disclosure is an important regulatory mechanism, it is not substantive regulation.  This 
section will discuss some of the reasons that collectively impact why the Proposed 
Regulations are not likely to have significant effect on board decision-making involving 
executive compensation. 
 
163 Eric Dash, Off to the Races Again, Leaving Many Behind, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, p. 
1. 
164 In fact, one poll of human resources consulting firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide concluded that most 
American companies did not plan to change their programs.  See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could 
Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, p. 1.  In the past, every time that the SEC has 
mandated additional disclosure, executive pay has actually increased.  Id. at p. 10. 
165 2006 WL 1562466. 
166 See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 
3, p. 1(discussing Lucian Bebchuk’s prediction that companies may change compensation packages to 
more useful elements once public disclosure reaches some of the formerly hidden elements). 
167 See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 
3, p. 10(discussing Lucian Bebchuk’s prediction that companies may change compensation packages to 
more useful elements once public disclosure reaches some of the formerly hidden elements). 
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A. Compensation Decisions May Be Different from Other Board Decisions  
 
State law vests the corporate board with decision making for the company, to which the 
business judgment rule give protections, subject to the duties of care and loyalty.168 Not 
all decisions that a corporate board makes, however, are treated the same in terms of the 
extent of judicial review and degree of protection by the business judgment rule.  Plenty 
of examples exist, though they tend to fall into two categories of decisions: (i) where the 
board’s independent decision-making is questioned and (ii) where the impact on the 
company will fundamentally affect the way in which the company will continue.   
 
With respect to the first category, in Delaware, for instance, pre-suit demand on the board 
by shareholders in deritivative actions is excused when “futile” due to doubt about the 
board disinterestedness or independence and doubt about whether the business judgment 
rule affords protection.169 The rationale is that sometimes the board is “incapable, due to 
personal interest or domination and control, of objectively evaluating a shareholder 
demand, if made,” and thereby exercising the board’s decision-making authority for the 
corporation.170 In a takeover situation, a board’s decision to institute defensive tactics 
must be supported by a reasonable response to the threat posed since the takeover context 
presents the "omnipresent specter" that a board will act in its own best interests, rather 
than the shareholders’ interests.171 Similarly, in the parent-subsidiary context where the 
board’s independence is questioned because the parent dominates the board, board 
decisions are subjected to a higher standard of scrutiny if there is evidence of self 
dealing.172 As another example, board decisions are subjected to heightened scrutiny in 
parent-subsidiary mergers where there is evidence that the transaction was not negotiated 
at arms-length.173 
With respect to the second category, there are some decisions which cannot be made by 
the board alone due to the affect on the company as an ongoing entity.  For instance, the 
following decisions require the board to submit the matter to the shareholders after board 
vote: (i) approval of mergers;174 (ii) approval of amendments to the certificate of 
incorporation;175 and (iii) approval of certain business combinations involving interested 
shareholders.176 Additionally, shareholders can propose amendments to the company’s 
bylaws by their own initiative.177 
168 See, e.g., 8 Del.C. § 141. 
169 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814, 816 (DE. 1984); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256. 
170 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 257.  See also, Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the 
American Law Institute, 48 Bus.Law. 1443, 1444 (1993) (“[C]ourts both in and out of Delaware have ruled 
with near unanimity ···· that the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of judicial review in 
cases where an independent majority of a corporation's board of directors determines that litigation on 
behalf of the corporation will not serve the best interests of the corporation.”). 
171 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (DE. 1985). 
172 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (DE. 1971). 
173 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (DE. 1983). 
174 See, e.g., 8 Del.C. § 251. 
175 See, e.g., 8 Del.C. § 242. 
176 See e.g., 8 Del.C. § 203. 
177 See 8 Del. C.§ 109(b). 
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Compensation decisions share some of the characteristics of both categories of decision.   
With respect to the first category where the board’s independence might be in doubt, it is 
easy to question whether corporate boards bargain at arms-lengths with executives over 
compensation matters and remain faithful to shareholder interests.178 Recent empirical 
work by Professors Randall Martin and Stewart Schwab examining the contracts of CEOs 
concluded that “CEOs have significant bargaining power in their negotiations over the 
terms of their employment contracts and change-in-control agreements.”179 
A number of questions exist regarding the board’s ability to engage in arms-length 
contracting with CEOs.  First, directors may be motivated to make arrangements 
favorable to executives out of  “collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict 
within the board team, and sometimes friendship and loyalty . . . .”180 Second, directors 
might not have enough time, resources or connection to a company themselves through 
stock ownership and otherwise to take on the difficult and sometimes unpleasant job of 
tough negotiations with a current or future executive over compensation.181 Third, board 
members might certainly be motivated by a desire to be reelected to the board. 182 
Reelection requires a board member to be nominated to the company slate.183 
Nomination, typically by a nominating committee, is often heavily influenced by the 
same executives whose compensation the board members approve.184 Fourth, the ability 
of the executives to benefit the directors through director compensation packages, 
charitable giving and other business dealings with companies with which the director is 
associated suggest a picture of entangled interests.185 Finally, the “managerial power” 
approach asserts simply that powerful executives are able to receive higher compensation 
packages less sensitive to performance from corporate boards.186 
178 See, e.g., Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 23-44; Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of 
William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 
Del. J. Corp. L. 79, at 104 (2005) (describing executive compensation decisions as “self-dealing”); Kenneth 
West, Pay Without Performance: An Executive’s Perspective, 30 J. CORP. L. 791, at 792-93 
(2005)(describing board influence by managerial power).  See also, Jennifer Hill & Charles M. Yablon, 
Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, 25 U. 
NEW S. WALES L.J. 1 (2002) (executive compensation is a corporate governance problem arising out of 
managerial conflicts of interest).  But see, Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra 
note 1, at 15-17. 
179 Stewart Schwab and Randall Martin, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do 
Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. LEE L. R. 231, 266 (2006). 
180 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 4.  See also, Kenneth West, Pay Without Performance: An 
Executive’s Perspective, 30 J. CORP. L.  at 792-93; Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay Problem, FORTUNE,
June 30, 2006 (reporting the findings of a PricewaterhouseCoopers poll that boards are having trouble 
controlling the size of executive compensation). 
181 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 4. 
182 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1 at 24. 
183 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1 at 24. 
184 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 25-6; Orin Kramer, Pay Without Performance: The 
Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. Corp. L. at 773-74 (arguing that directors want to be reelected 
and that reelection depends on what management and the other directors think, making it uncomfortable to 
push a CEO). 
185 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 27-30. 
186 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 5; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (the "managerial 
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The connection to the second category of decisions impacting the way in which the 
company will continue is present, but seems not as strong.   Although executive 
compensation decisions are often “material” ones to the company, the expenditure 
doesn’t typically amount to a large amount of the companies’ total assets.187 
Nevertheless, companies expect CEOs to have a great impact on the company’s future 
prospects and measure CEO success in terms of company stock performance, earnings 
growth, cost reduction, etc.  Further, even the decision to hire a particular executive can 
have substantial effect on the market price for company stock.  When Disney hired Ovitz, 
for instance, the release of the news caused the Disney stock price to jump 4.4% in a 
single day.188 
These reasons suggest that executive compensation decisions present issues that may 
distinguish them from other, more routine, board decisions.  Whereas we can expect the 
board to negotiate at arms length in many situations, executive compensation decisions 
have characteristics of other areas in corporate governance where decision-making is 
normally subjected to additional processes or higher standards of review.  Further, there 
are indices that even corporate managers and the corporate community have long 
perceived that compensation decisions are distinguishable from routine decision-making 
by: (1) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing rules that require companies to have  a 
compensation committee composed of “independent directors” which operate under a 
written charter describing the responsibilities of the committee;189 (2) hiring 
compensation consultants, preparation of spreadsheets and similar documents; and (3) 
 
power approach" explains board deviance from optimal executive compensation packages due to the 
board’s influence by or sympathy to the executives).  For a critical discussion of the managerial power 
approach used to explain the rise in executive compensation, see Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the 
CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003). ); Michael Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the 
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 255 (2005)(concluding that managerial power affects director’s decisions to give higher 
compensation packages to executives).  A Watson Wyatt Worldwide survey of directors and institutional 
investors found that while only forty-eight percent of directors think that executives heavily influence 
executive pay decisions, eighty-seven percent of institutional investors believe executives heavily influence 
the process.  Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive Pay Model Mixed Reviews, 
Watson Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (last visited July 18, 2006). 
187 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 260.  See also, Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the 
Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U.PA.L.REV. 1205, 1235 (1999) 
(arguing that “[e]xecutive compensation makes up such a small percentage of a firm's assets that even 
excessive pay packages will likely not cause a blip in a firm's stock value.”); cf. id. (contrasting executive 
compensation with decisions by a company's board regarding takeovers, which have a great effect on a 
company's stock price). 
188 2006 WL 1562466, at 5. 
189 See, New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, P 303A.05, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/lcm/1078416930957.html?enable=section&n
umber=3&ssnumber=303a.00 (last visited August 7, 2006) [hereinafter NYSE].  See also, National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Inc., Marketplace Rules, IM 4350(c), 
available at http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=18 (last 
visited August 7, 2006)(rules require compensation decisions to be approved or recommended  to the board 
by a compensation committee or independent board members)[hereinafter NASDAQ].   
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spending increasing amounts of board and committee time on executive compensation 
matters.190 If board decisions regarding compensation are distinguishable from other 
routine decisions, the regulatory response might also entail more than business judgment 
review and disclosure. 
While it seems likely that the Proposed Regulations and Existing Regulations would have 
required disclosure of the OEA, disclosure does not consider the relationships that make 
executive compensation decisions different from routine board matters.  These concerns 
are summed up by Professor Lucian Bebchuk: “The factors impeding arm’s length 
contracting are in part a product of legal rules and corporate practices.  With the rules and 
practices that we have had to date, directors have been subject to a myriad of incentives 
and forces that have prevented them from bargaining at arm’s length with the CEO over 
pay.”191 The effectiveness of information disclosure hinges on the effect that disclosure 
will have on decision makers.  Adding more disclosure is unlikely to enhance arm’s 
length dealings here. 
 
B. The Gap: Performance of the Board’s Duty of Care and Good Faith 
Obligations Will Permit Some Excessive Compensation Packages    
 
Another challenge facing the SEC is the gap existing between disclosure and state law 
regulation of executive compensation decision-making.  State law creates accountability 
for only some executive compensation decisions.  Excessive compensation packages are 
not necessarily the product of a lack of due care, bad faith or waste.   An important 
category of excessive executive compensation packages are those adopted in accordance 
with state law duties, and perhaps even with “best practices.”192 The OEA was adopted 
with due care, in good faith and was not waste, yet some shareholders were outraged 
enough to litigate the matter for years.193 
The “best practices” described by the Delaware Supreme Court for executive 
compensation decision-making might help, but won’t prevent excessive packages.194 
First, the compensation committee members should receive (preferably in advance of the 
meeting) a spreadsheet or document prepared by a compensation expert disclosing the 
amounts the executive might receive under various alternatives.195 Second, the 
compensation expert or a committee member should explain the spreadsheet or document 
to the committee with the document being an exhibit to committee minutes.196 Finally, 
the committee members would then have deliberations and discussion.197 The In re Walt 
Disney Court observed that following this “tidy” process will eliminate the basis for 
litigation.198 
190 See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466, at 18 (discussing the “best practices” for compensation matters). 
191 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 43. 
192 See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466, at 18 (discussing the “best practices” for compensation matters).   
193 2006 WL 1562466. 
194 2006 WL 1562466, at 18. 
195 2006 WL 1562455, at 18. 
196 2006 WL 1562455, at 18. 
197 2006 WL 1562455, at 18. 
198 2006 WL 1562455, at 18. 
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Best practices from Disney are likely to be adopted by companies, but will not 
prevent excessive compensation packages.   The exercise of best practices 
contemplates a board or committee using procedural safeguards, not substantive 
ones. If a compensation decision is later challenged by shareholders, state law 
only considers the procedural due care employed by the board or committee and 
does not involve a substantive review of compensation decisions.199 So long as 
procedural measures are employed, shareholders will have no basis to litigate.  A 
problem that shareholders face, therefore, is that while the Proposed Regulations 
may aid in the discovery of excessive compensation packages, this limit on state 
law remedies creates a gap where excessive packages will remain.   
 
C. Shareholders Lack Meaningful Ability to Challenge Board Decisions 
 
Even if the Proposed Regulations operate as intended to trigger additional company 
disclosure they will not be effective because shareholders do not have much of a role in 
establishing executive compensation packages and little ability to challenge decisions 
afterwards.200 We count on corporate boards to make decisions for the company.  
Accountability, though, is key to policing board decision-making.  For instance, 
shareholders unhappy with board decision-making over executive compensation matters 
often have little ability to oust directors in a proxy contest or hostile takeover, since such 
contests are rare.201 Furthermore, shareholders cannot rely on state law to eliminate 
excessive packages because board compliance with the law does not eliminate excessive 
packages, discussed supra. 
 
It might be argued that aggrieved shareholders displeased with compensation policies can 
simply sell their shares.   This would only affect corporate policy if enough shareholders 
were to sell shares in response to compensation policy.  Not all shareholders, for instance 
ones with indexed investmetns, can simply readjust investments.  Furthermore, to the 
extent excessive compensation practices are widespread, selling may not operate as a 
check on the market.202 In fact, few shareholdes actually sell in response to unhappiness 
with compensation policies.203 For these reasons, the option of selling seems to be a 
weak check on compensation policy. 
 
199 Brehm, 746 A.2d 244. 
200 See, Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 
3, p. 10.  For a discussion of the challenges facing shareholders, see, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, 
Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 613 (2001). 
201 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11; Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001)(proxy contests 
of this sort are rare and expensive). 
202 Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 25-26 (this could result in a 
shareholder having to leave the market entirely); Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (even institutional 
shareholders may not have the portfolio flexibility in order to simply sell all shares).  See also, See Robert 
B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to "Just Say 
No," 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 999 (1999). 
203 Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 570. 
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In practice, affirmative shareholder initiatives objecting to executive compensation 
(mostly unsuccessful) have mostly centered on three areas: (i) suing the board under state 
law;204 (ii) voting against employee stock option plans;205 and (iii) putting forward 
shareholder precatory resolutions under Rule 14a-8 of the federal proxy rules.206 
Derivative suits are constrained by the due care, good faith and waste analyses, which are 
procedural inquiries that limit shareholder ability to object compensation packages that 
are excessive on a substantive level.207 Furthermore, one must question whether courts 
are in the best situation to evaluate the merits of executive compensation plans.208 
Shareholder voting on employee stock option plans has not been an effective restraint on 
executive compensation.  Shareholders typically vote on a plan as a whole, not with 
respect to how the plan rewards a particular executive in the future.209 Finally, 
shareholder precatory resolutions on executive compensation matters, even when 
effectively framed such that widespread support is possible, only have a limited impact 
on board decision-making because they are purely advisory.210 
The less successful experience of American shareholders attempts to affect management 
decision-making might be distinguished from that of European company shareholders.  In 
many European companies, five or ten shareholders own substantial stakes in many 
companies.  With the ownership more concentrated, these larger shareholders are more 
 
204 See, e.g., 2006 WL 1562466.  See, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to 
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 571(examining 124 cases where shareholders 
have brought claims of excessive compensation and concluding that shareholders are more likely to find 
success against smaller corporations when litigating outside of Delaware). 
205 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 45; Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001). 
206 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 45. 
207 See supra Part IV.B.  See also, Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 45.  Court review is 
procedural and does not involve “substantive due care” review of the executive compensation package.  
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244. 
208 Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 20-21; Randall Thomas and 
Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 604 
(2001) (concluding that courts should only have a limited role in policing procedural aspects of 
compensation practices). 
209 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 48-51; Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating 
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001) (shareholder 
opposition to these plans does not seem to have had much effect on their use or growth). 
210 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 51-52; Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 26 (noting the limited effect shareholders can have with precatory 
resolutions); Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in 
Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2001) (these proposals typically get less than ten percent of the 
vote); Brownstein and Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority 
Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23 (2004)(concluding that boards can resist the adoption of shareholder 
proposals, but should take them seriously).  In the case of HP, shareholders mounted and succeeded in an 
effort to get the company to adopt a policy requiring a shareholder vote for any severance package 
exceeding 2.99 times the executive’s base salary plus bonus.  See, Benjamin Pimentel, HP Sued over 
Fiorina’s $42 Million in Exit Pay; Shareholders Say Company, Directors Disregarded Own Rules with 
Golden Parachute, San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 2006, at C1 (two institutional investors sued HP 
over Fiorina severance package allegedly in violation of this board policy). 
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able to take their complaints to management and get a response.211 Even for smaller 
stakeholders, strong European initiatives aimed at disclosure to shareholders in advance 
of board meetings, coupled with shareholder rights to challenge resolutions not properly 
disclosed, offer protections.212 It might be observed, though, that the ability of larger 
shareholders in European companies to impact management decisions might also 
adversely affecting the rights of minority shareholders in the same company.213 
The SEC has identified a strategy for dealing with excessive compensation: “to help 
investors keep an eye on how much of their money is being paid to the top executives 
who work for them.”214 Given the obstacles to challenging compensation decisions, 
American shareholders, who often do not have substantial stakes in any individual 
corporation, find it difficult to achieve changes in corporate policy.  The Proposed 
Regulations will provide the shareholders information, but reacting to it will be 
troublesome.  Although this approach is laudable, it does not suggest or entail 
accountability.  Chairman Cox has explained “the SEC lacks statutory authority to 
impose salary caps on corporate executives and we'd be out of bounds to attempt that 
through indirection.”215 Without holding corporate decision makers accountable to the 
shareholders, however, the Proposed Regulations will be not change much in the world of 
executive compensation. 
D. Disclosure of Compensation Information in a Transparent Format is Critical  
but is Not Enough   
 
Yet another problem facing the SEC is that disclosure is not the equivalent of merit 
 
211 See, Rafael LaPorta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999)(presents 
empirical evidence illustrating the different corporate ownership patterns).  See also, e.g., High Level 
Group of Co. Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe 59-60 (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/consult_en.pdf (last visited ???); Felicia Kung,
The Regulation of Corporate Bond Offerings: A Comparative Analysis 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 409, 436 
(2005) (investors have less need to sue issuers because they have more power vis-à-vis the company); Luca 
Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1, 29 (2006)(how company ownership concentration affects preemptive rights);  John Huber and 
Alexander Cohen, Foreign Issuers and The Regulatory Agenda: Deregistration and IFRS Transition, 1544 
PLI/Corp 9 (May 2006)(arguing that concentrated ownership in European companies affects new 
deregistration rules). 
212 But see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate Control - A Convergence Theory of 
Shareholder Rights 53-58 (Ctr. for Bus. & Corp. Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 0001, 2004), 
available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=600722 (last visited July 18, 
2006)(arguing the relevance of shareholder approval of certain decisions in countries where the law 
protects minority shareholders by imposing a broad duty to disclose information prior to a meeting and by 
granting individual shareholders the right to challenge the validity of shareholder meetings resolutions 
taken without due disclosure). 
213 Jennifer Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 367, 387 (2005). 
See also, e.g., High Level Group of Co. Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe 14-15 (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/consult_en.pdf  (last visited ???) (independent 
monitoring on behalf of minority shareholders is needed). 
214 Cox Speech, supra note 13. 
215 Cox Speech, supra note 13. 
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review or substantive regulation of conduct.  Some believe, for instance, that the 
increased disclosure requirements anticipated by the Proposed Regulations will actually 
result in new increases in executive compensation levels.216 New surveys indicate that 
most companies will not change compensation policies in response to the Proposed 
Regulations.217 
The benefit to the public of having full access in a fully transparent way to executive 
compensation policies, practices and data cannot be understated.218 Brandeis’ oft-quoted 
statement "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman" is appropriate here.219 Transparency, if achieved, certainly will have an 
effect on the ability of executives to receive executive compensation packages that are 
less coupled to performance.220 Disclosure makes sure that all investors have access to 
compensation information prior to making an investment.221 It is widely believed that 
access to understandable financial data even by the market professionals alone would 
result in the data being reflected in the pricing of the stock.222 Reflection of information 
in stock prices and opening access to information prior to investment, though, is not the 
same as providing accountability for decision-making or changing compensation policies 
or processes to protect an investment once made.223 Should we employ a regulatory 
approach for executive compensation that is predominately dependent on investor choice 
at the purchase stage?  What about information overload, overconfidence in one’s ability 
to decipher information, optimism and other barriers to disclosure based regulation?224 
216 Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 1 
(noting that every time disclosure increases, pay increases also); Floyd Norris, New York Times, June 2, 
2006, Sec. C., at 1 (same). 
217 Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 1 
(describing a poll by WatsonWyatt Worldwide, a human resources firm, which found that only 1 in 10 
would make changes in compensation programs).  See also, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate 
Directors Give Executive Pay Model Mixed Reviews, Watson Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available 
at http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 (last visited July 18, 2006)(  “While most 
directors believe the executive pay system needs further reform, they are unlikely to make dramatic 
changes to their programs.”). 
218 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11, 192; David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 453 (2004)(disclosure regulations 
"increase transparency and thereby increase informational efficiency of markets"). Claudia Deutsch, Behind 
Big Dollars, Worrisome Boards, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 7.. 
219 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It , 92 (1914). 
220 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11. 
221 See, H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) reprinted in 5 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1934 
(J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) ("No investor...can safely buy and sell securities upon the 
exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he 
buys or sells."); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a 
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 152-54. 
222 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 192; Claudia Deutsch, Behind Big Dollars, Worrisome 
Boards, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 7. 
223 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 192; Claudia Deutsch, Behind Big Dollars, Worrisome 
Boards, New York Times, April 9, 2006, Sec. 3, at 7; Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 24 (“it is clear that disclosure should not be regarded as an effective 
limitation on compensation”). 
224 See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a 
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 160-72 (2006). 
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The SEC has often turned its focus to disclosure based regulations,225 rather than merit 
review or substantive regulation, under the belief that the market assumes that investors 
make informed decisions with full disclosure.226 As an example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) contains substantive prohibitions against certain corporate 
behavior.  Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley is intended "to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . 
."227 The advantage of disclosure as a regulatory approach is that it serves as a less 
invasive government intrusion into companies and allows investors to make their own 
personal choices about investments.228 This theory fails to appreciate, first, that investors 
don’t always make rational decisions in making an initial investment, and, second, that 
investors need options other than selling in response to disclosure of information about 
excessive compensation to executives.  That is, not all investor behavior can fall neatly 
into buy and sell decisions in response to information.  Investors are vulnerable to 
corporate misdealing not only from lack of information about executive compensation, 
but limits on their decisions.229 Regulating conduct, rather than disclosure surely is more 
complicated.230 
Traditional SEC disclosure-focused programs can produce results in other areas, such as 
making sure that the prospectus in an initial public offering that contains misstatements 
creates liability for the issuer.231 Using the same approach for executive compensation 
matters is not likely to yield the same meaningful results.  For instance, information 
overload is a problem with disclosure-based regulatory systems generally,232 but will 
 
225 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation, 29 (3d ed. rev. 1998); Susanna Kim Ripken, The 
Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. 139, 145-46 (2006)(questioning the continuation of the disclosure approach). 
226 See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 22 (5th ed. 2005);  SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).  The House Report on the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 commented: "No investor...can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an 
intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells....[T]he hiding 
and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value." H.R. 
Rep. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934), reprinted in 5Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1934 (J.S. 
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). 
227 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in various 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preamble) (emphasis added). 
228 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 149-55 (2006). 
229 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 148 (2006). 
230 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 148-49 (2006). 
231 But see, Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 185-87  (2006) (arguing the 
weaknesses of the SEC’s disclosure approach). 
232 See generally, Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief 
Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 325 (1974); Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A 
Survey of Comments and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689, 692 
(1985)(even sophisticated analysts can have difficulty with complex regulatory disclosure); Susanna Kim 
Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. R. at 185 (2006); Ray J. Groves, Here's the Annual Report. Got a Few 
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particularly be a hurdle to investors understanding executive compensation disclosure.  
The Proposed Regulations contemplate no less than eight complex graphs and extensive 
narrative discussion.233 Additionally, the SEC is attempting to avoid “boilerplate” 
disclosure of compensation information with the Proposed Regulations.234 Because 
lawyers draft much of documents filed with the SEC, 235 boilerplate will be almost 
impossible to eliminate with the Proposed Regulations.  Further, most of the disclosure 
contemplated by the Proposed Regulations will be received after executive compensation 
decisions are made, which does not provide existing shareholders with meaningful 
options other than selling their shares.   
 
Moreover, although the Proposed Regulations create liability for misstatements, this does 
not mean that the SEC is undertaking merit review of executive compensation decisions.  
In fact, Chairman Cox specifically said that the SEC is not in the business of setting 
compensation or evaluating compensation decisions.236 Nevertheless, Chairman Cox is 
clearly hoping that fuller disclosure will result in changes to executive compensation 
policies and programs.237 Unfortunately, Chairman Cox’ intention may not be realizable 
in light of the following realities: (1) most companies don’t plan to change their 
practices;238 (2) most directors don’t believe that the current executive compensation 
approach is flawed;239 (3) the board’s role as an independent decision maker is 
compromised;240 (4) the gap between state and federal regulation of state law results 
allows some excessive compensation packages to exist;241 and (5) shareholders lack the 
ability to attack compensation plans they perceive as excessive.242 As a result, the 
Proposed Regulations may not have the level of impact that the SEC and the public want. 
 
Hours?, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1994, at A12; Kimberly Strassell, The Weekend Interview with Christopher 
Cox: Full Disclosure, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 20, 2006, at A8 (“today’s disclosure system is 
impenetrable to all but whiz kid financial analysts”). 
233 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6548, 6556, 6559-62, 6565 (The following tables are 
contemplated: Summary Compensation, Grants of Performance-Based Awards, Grants of All Other Equity 
Awards, Outstanding Equity Awards At Fiscal Year End, Option Exercises and Stock Vested, Retirement 
Plan Potential Annual Payments and Benefits,  Nonqualified Defined Contribution and Other Deferred 
Compensation Plans, Director Compensation) 
234 Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 6546. 
235 Alan B. Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 BUS. LAW. 61, 68 (1971); 
see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 429 n.58 (2003)  429 n.58 ("companies often disclose information not 
to better inform investors, but to reduce the risk of liability for omitting a material fact or disclosing a 'half 
truth"'). 
236 Cox speech, supra note 13; Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, 
at Sec. 3, p. 1 (April 9, 2006)(“government should stay out of business of setting executive compensation”). 
237 Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, New York Times, April 9, 2006, at Sec. 3, p. 
1 (Cox is hoping that compensation decision makers will “pay more attention to their figures”); but see 
Comment of Steve Odland , Business Roundtable, at 2-3, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/sodland041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006)(“The 
rules should be designed to elicit information on the corporate governance context in which compensation 
decisions are made without unduly or inappropriately affecting that context.”).  
238 See supra notes 185 and 234. 
239 See supra notes 10, 205, 258. 
240 See supra Part  IV.A. 
241 See supra Part IV.B. 
242 See supra Part IV.C. 
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Executive compensation presents a difficult situation for regulators.  The Proposed 
Regulations would require companies to disclose substantial amounts of compensation 
data, but to what result?  Many directors believe that disclosure of increased 
compensation information is a positive change because it will demonstrate that the 
existing pay system works.243 Sometimes direct regulation of conduct is more effective 
to deter fraud or bad practices.244 Professor Charles Elson sums it up: “[d]isclosure is 
like an aspirin; it can make you feel a little better, but it can’t even cure the common cold 
. . . . The fact is, a board that overpays the C.E.O. is in all probability not minding the 
store on other issues either.”245 For these reasons, disclosure regulatory programs are 
unlikely to enjoy widespread impact on compensation policies with more stringent 
regulation. 
 
At this juncture, the SEC has not been fully candid about the limitations of solely 
continuing an information disclosure regulatory approach.  As Representative Barney 
Frank commented:   
 
[T]he proposed rule is an excellent first step, and I hope we can work 
together to ensure that shareholders have the tools needed to address 
executive compensation and corporate governance as they see fit. For a 
market to work, however, participants require information; and choice. 
This proposed rule would give shareholders valuable information relating 
to executive compensation, but does not give them much hope for doing 
anything about it. Short of shaming boards into holding executives 
accountable, the proposed rule does not ensure that shareholders can 
effectively change compensation practices.246 
Of course, even if the SEC does not pursue additional regulation now, corporations have 
no assurances that this policy would continue.  The SEC, particularly in the event of a 
 
243 See Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Corporate Directors Give Executive Pay Model Mixed Reviews, Watson 
Wyatt Survey Finds, June 20, 2006, available at http://www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=16180 
(last visited July 18, 2006)(only 41% of directors think that the current model of executive pay is poor). 
244 See Anderson, supra note 243, at 343 ("direct regulation of conduct may be the best means of deterring 
fraud and undesirable practices"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical 
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1115 
(1977)("[d]isinfectants are not, after all, a universal panacea, sometimes surgery is required."); William O. 
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 528 (1934)(substantive regulation is sometimes more 
effective).  But see, A.A. Sommer, Jr., Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Protection, 27 BUS.
LAW. 85, 88 (1971)(discussing the disclosure approach to securities regulation); Paula Walter, The 
Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not to Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543, 545-46 (1997) 
(“self-determination, which assures that man is master of his destiny, is deeply rooted in our legal system 
and is the legal mirror of the Western values system, which exalts the individual"). 
245 Claudia Deutsch, Behind Big Dollars, Worrisome Boards, New York Times, April 9, 2006 at Sec. 3, p. 7 
(interview with Elson). 
246 Comment of Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Securities and Exchange Commission Website, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf (last visited July 6, 2006).  See also, Lucian 
Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, Forbes, January 19, 2006 (SEC rules will not fix problems of executive 
compensation). 
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mandate by Congress or in the wake of another corporate scandal, could easily change its 
mind at a later date.247 The SEC's assertion of only informational jurisdiction over 
executive compensation as part of its core mission leaves much undone with the gap 
existing between the SEC’s information disclosure and the In re Walt Disney expression 
of shareholder recourse for excessive compensation.   Without more marked changes, the 
Proposed Regulations aren’t likely to have significant impact on compensation decisions 
or practices.   
V. Filling the Gap between In Re Walt Disney and Disclosure 
 
The gap between the disclosure required by the Proposed Regulations and the procedural 
review contemplated by In re Walt Disney could be filled with three different 
approaches: (1) federal legislation, including amending the Exchange Act or Sarbanes-
Oxley to alter the corporate governance framework; (2) state legislation, including 
enhancements of shareholder control over approval of executive compensation packages; 
or (3) corporate self-regulation, such as enhanced listing requirements by SROs.  These 
alternatives each raise issues with the appropriate role of regulators balanced against the 
preference for the market to operate freely.  This section will examine some of the 
possible solutions in each of these approaches and evaluate their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
A.  Federal Interest in Regulation of Executive Compensation   
 
The Proposed Regulations ask corporations to disclose executive compensation 
information to the public; if disclosed appropriately, that is the end of the SEC’s 
involvement.  Nevertheless, the federal government has demonstrated that it can make 
greater intrusions in the traditionally state realm of corporate governance beyond 
disclosure.  For instance, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), represents federal  
involvement, through the SEC, in corporate governance through the FCPA’s prohibitions 
on  bribery of and other certain payments to foreign officials by corporations and 
recordkeeping requirements.248 
More recently, the federal government again demonstrated that it will enter corporate 
governance in response to scandal.  Sarbanes-Oxley regulates corporate conduct, in 
addition to containing disclosure requirements.  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley grants to 
the SEC of authority with  respect to matters of board composition and committee 
structure.249 The SEC can also prohibit through administrative, rather than court, 
 
247 See, Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational 
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MN. L. R. 277, 279 (2004)(arguing that government collects 
information and then may use it to support the need to regulate at a later date). 
248 Exchange Act, §§ 13(b)(2), 30A, 32; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff, added by Public L. No. 
95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (Dec. 19, 1977). ). Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream, supra note X. 
248 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 402(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2002). 
248 Exchange Act, § 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (2001). 
249 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections 
of 11, 15 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). See also, Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002) (audit 
committees requirements).  For a general discussion of the new role of the federal government in 
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proceedings, executives from serving as corporate officers.250 Importantly, Sarbanes-
Oxley takes a shot at executive compensation by prohibiting most types of loans to 
company executives.251 Additionally, the CEO and CFO must return bonuses, incentives 
and equity based compensation and certain profits from the sale of securities if the 
corporation has to file an accounting restatement due to misconduct.252 Sarbanes-Oxley 
also prohibits directors and executive officers of issuers from trading in any equity 
securities of the issuer during any employee fund blackout period.253 
The Exchange Act grants to the SEC wide authority over Self-Regulated Organization 
("SRO") rules, including the power to approve or disapprove rule changes and to 
unilaterally change SRO rules,254 so long as  the SEC is acting "in furtherance of the 
purposes of the Exchange Act."255 Because Sarbanes-Oxley greatly expanded the SEC’s 
authority over corporate governance matters under the Exchange Act, the SEC may find 
that it has increased ability to use listing rules to regulate corporate governance matters 
generally and executive compensation specifically.256 
One issue yet to be mentioned is whether there is any potential for further federal 
involvement in executive compensation regulation.257 To remedy remaining abuses, the 
SEC could attempt to use its Sarbanes-Oxley authority to regulate compensation 
committees or shareholder involvement in compensation decisions, perhaps using its 
authority over SRO listing rules.258 As Professor Roberta Karmel has observed: “the 
SEC is an agency with a very long institutional memory that has always acquired more 
power in response to crisis and scandal, and the future use it may make of the additional 
power it has acquired pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley is unknown.”259 Thus far, however, 
the SEC has been discouraged by the business community (and the CEOs in particular) 
from attempting more substantial reforms in the corporate governance area.260 
governance matters, see Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 79 (2005). 
250 Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105(f),15 U.S.C.§ 78u-3(f) (2002). 
251 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 402(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2002). 
252 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002).  The SEC can freeze corporate assets to prevent 
payments of bonuses to executives in cases involving financial fraud. 
Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2002).  
253 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2002). 
254 Exchange Act, § 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (2001). 
255 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 409-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
256 The SEC most recently amended SRO rules regarding internet publication of SRO rules.  69 Fed. Reg. 
60287 (Oct. 8, 2004).   
257 See supra Part IV. 
258 In 2003, the SEC proposed rules concerning corporate governance that would allow nominations of 
directors by certain shareholders in a limited amount of circumstances where the nomination would be part 
of the company’s proxy materials.  Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 
48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).  No final action has occurred on this proposed rule. 
259 Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream, supra note X, at 143. 
260 The Business Roundtable prepared a lengthy opposition to the SEC’s proposed rules on “Security 
Holder Direct Nominations”, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct.23,  2003),  that would have increased shareholder 
access to the nomination process.  See, Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, The Business 
Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (December 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (last visited July 24, 2006). 
THE HOUSE OF MOUSE AND BEYOND   40  
If outrage over executive compensation persists and the SEC is unable to react, however, 
new federal law could result. In fact, the Protection Against Executive Compensation 
Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, (H.R. 4291)261 was introduced in 2005.  H.R. 4291 would amend 
the Exchange Act to require specific disclosures of compensation figures that are subject 
to shareholder votes approving compensation and golden parachute plans.262 H.R. 4291 
would mandate executives to return to companies any compensation received: (1) that 
was not approved by the shareholders; (2) where the executive does not meet the stated 
job performance measures; (3) that is incentive compensation or bonuses received by the 
executive “within 18 months before any negative material restatement by the issuer;” or 
(4) that is “related to fraud or misrepresentation” by the executive.263 
The main advantage of federal regulation of executive compensation is uniformity of 
regulation across state lines, most likely under the Exchange Act.  The SEC is already 
involved in monitoring and reporting of many matters under the Exchange Act and 
certainly could monitor compliance with new regulation in the area of executive 
compensation.  In fact, the SEC already has some involvement in executive compensation 
through the existing loan prohibitions and other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
Moreover, the SEC already has an enforcement apparatus available to sanction 
corporations that do not comply fully.   
 
Corporate governance has historically been a matter of state, not federal law, however.  
For this reason, existing federal involvement in corporate governance is only sporadic, 
not comprehensive.  Nevertheless, the federal government clearly could regulate 
executive compensation matters.  One must question, though, whether expanding the 
federal role is the optimal response.  Because corporate governance in general is a matter 
left to state law, the federal government does not seem to be the first line of defense for 
reforming the specific area of corporate governance concerning compensation matters.  
Reformation of executive compensation is better done in the context of the existing 
corporate governance structure covering a variety of matters, which is set by state, not 
federal, law.  Federal government regulation of compensation seems to be a measure of 
last resort.  Of course, the SEC could work with state governments on this issue. 
 
B.  State Interest in Regulating Executive Compensation   
 
The Supreme Court has observed that "[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and 
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except 
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."264 For this 
reason, state courts and legislatures have a strong interest in regulating executive 
compensation and are the most logical actors here.  Quite simply, it is important that 
 
261 See, Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005)(referred to 
the Committee on Financial Services and in committee as of this writing).   
262 Id.
263 Id. 
264 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
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shareholders have tools to evaluate and respond to inefficient or excessive executive 
compensation packages.265 The Proposed Regulations give shareholders substantial 
disclosure for evaluation, which leaves remedy as the focus here.  Potential state law 
remedies to fill the gap between existing federal and state regulation of executive 
compensation seem to fall in three general areas: (1) increased court review; (2) 
shareholder approval of compensation arrangements; and (3) greater shareholder role in 
the election of directors.   
 
One state law alternative to fill the gap would be to simply treat executive compensation 
decisions like other self-dealing transactions and submit them to a fairness review when 
the issue is litigated.266 Although this would still require shareholders to litigate instances 
of excessive compensation, raising the standard of review in litigation for such 
transactions would arguably have the effect of: (1) increasing the likelihood of success in 
excessive compensation cases; and (2) change the way in which compensation 
committees make decisions.  Similarly, courts could treat executive compensation 
decisions as ones with demand futility automatically to overcome barriers to challenging 
compensation decisions.  Professors Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin have suggested 
that courts could require companies to justify significant deviations from medial levels of 
executive compensation:  
 
[T]he strongest case in favor of courts looking closely at executive pay at 
public corporations is that they are best positioned to police abuses of the 
executive compensation process. . . . .   
 
A more difficult argument can be made in favor of courts policing the 
substance of outlier pay packages. This proposal is more likely to provoke 
claims of judicial incapacity and overreaching.  . . . While this change 
would do little to stop the apparently inexorable rise in the levels of 
executive pay over the last decade, it would give angry shareholders a 
more direct method of challenging extraordinary pay packages.267 
There is not much likelihood, however, that the courts or state legislatures will undertake 
substantive review of compensation packages in this manner.268 
Another way state legislatures could address the problem of executive compensation 
would be to make directors more accountable to the shareholders for compensation 
 
265 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 10. 
266 See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1899 (1992) (reviewing Graef Crystal: In Search of Excess (1991)) (arguing for an 
intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing compensation packages); Detev Vagts, Challenges to Executive 
Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 252-61 (1983) (arguing for testing of the 
reasonableness of compensation by comparing compensation levels with those of similar firms); Linda J. 
Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 
59 (1992) (same).  See generally, Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive 
Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 599-605 (discussing the arguments on both sides) 
267 Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 
79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 604-05. 
268 Id. at 605. 
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decisions.269 State statutes already require shareholder approval of a number of board 
decisions.270 The same statutes could also require shareholder approval (or even non-
binding review) of executive compensation agreements, or at least ones that include 
specified features.271 Similarly, state law could allow shareholders to pass resolutions on 
executive compensation policy that is binding on the board, rather than precatory.272 If 
shareholders could act collectively, there is also the possibility of passing a corporate 
bylaw related to executive compensation.273 
The disadvantage of this accountability model is that it does not tackle the problem at the 
decision-making level with the compensation committee.274 Moreover, it is uncertain 
whether the shareholders as a group will be motivated to first, sift through the 
voluminous disclosure contemplated by the Proposed Regulations, and second, react by 
challenging corporate policy and decision makers.275 Further, having shareholders 
undertake this role diverges from the concept of  a corporate board responsible to manage 
for shareholders who have ownership rights.276 This alternative might impact executive 
compensation decision-making, but may not be lead to optimal results as shareholders 
often desire not to have a substantial role in decision-making. 
 
Perhaps the most effective way to police executive compensation is to empower 
shareholders by giving them more power vis-à-vis the directors in a general manner.277 
That is, ensure that director interests are aligned with the shareholders.   This change 
would most likely require the state legislature to act.278 Although state law gives 
shareholders great latitude to tailor charter provisions away from the default statutory 
rules, Professor Henry Hansmann has explained the preference for statutory defaults as 
follows: 
 
269 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11. 
270 See supra notes x-xx and accompanying text. 
271 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 196-97; Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive 
Compensation, supra note 1, at 28 (recommending use of non-binding advisory votes annually on 
executive compensation matters); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder 
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1046, 1047-48 (1999)(suggesting that 
even advisory resolutions of shareholders on compensation measures have an effect on subsequent 
compensation decisions). 
272 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 198. 
273 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1047-48.  See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109 (1991); N.Y. Bus. 
Corp. Law § 601 (McKinney 1986); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 10.20 (1996). 
274 See supra Part IV.A. 
275 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1033 (“Compensation plans are complex, technical documents that 
cannot be readily understood without a substantial amount of knowledge about the intricacies of different 
types of pay programs.”). 
276 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1030-33 (asking whether shareholders should be engaged in the 
supervision of executive compensation matters). 
277 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, Forbes, January 19, 2006. 
278 Certainly state law gives shareholders great latitude to tailor charter provisions away from the default 
statutory rules. 
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The provisions of corporate law are essentially contract terms that can be 
repeatedly reformed by a third party--the state--to adapt them to changing 
circumstances. Thus, paradoxically, the great advantage of law over 
contract in organizing corporations is that rules of law are more easily 
changed.279 
Giving the shareholders more power could be accomplished by  giving the shareholders  
a greater role in setting director compensation by virtue of a statutory provision requiring 
shareholder approval of director compensation packages.  Additionally, the shareholders 
might also have a more meaningful role in the appointment and reelection of the board, 
which could also be accomplished by statutory changes.280 
Reinvigorating the director election process could go a long way in improving executive 
compensation decision-making by establishing a check on the alignment of director- 
shareholder interests.281 Yet, these potential changes would still leave core decision-
making on compensation matters with the board and compensation committees 
themselves, which is consistent with the authority of the board to manage corporate 
affairs.  Although the SEC has proposed rules that would allow shareholders a greater 
role in the nomination process and access to the proxy, a similar result seems more 
naturally effectuated under state law.  Even if shareholders don’t always vote on all 
matters before them on a regular basis, shareholders might be more active if there are 
alternatives to sitting directors or an ability to withhold votes from a sitting director who 
has voted in favor of an excessive compensation package. 
 
State legislatures undoubtedly have an interest in maintaining their control over corporate 
governance matters as a whole. As the Supreme Court stated in Cort v. Ash:282 
“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate 
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain 
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal 
affairs of the corporation.” 283 A number of alternatives are certainly available for state 
readjustment of executive compensation practices.  Of these, giving shareholders more 
involvement in the nomination and election of directors appears to be an attractive option 
as it should not seriously impact the director’s role in managing the corporate enterprise.   
 
Those who believe that executive compensation needs further policing, however, can 
expect the proponents of the existing state corporate governance regime that does not 
meaningfully distinguish compensation decisions from other routine corporate decisions 
to say that there is no problem with executive compensation practices and that allowing 
 
279 Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. ECON. R. 1, 2 (2006). 
280 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 207; Claudia Deutsch, Behind Big Dollars, Worrisome 
Boards, New York Times, Sec. 3, at 7 (April 9, 2006); Lucian Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, Forbes, 
January 19, 2006. 
281 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 207-8. 
282 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 80, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2087, 2090, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 
283 422 U.S., at 84, 95 S.Ct., at 2091. 
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shareholders greater involvement in corporate affairs is a bad thing.284 Even with 
Delaware’s pro-business history, that might be a difficult position if public outrage over 
executive compensation continues or another corporate scandal comes to light.   
 
C.  Special Concerns About Self Regulated Organizations 
 
An alternative to state or federal action is simply self regulation of executive 
compensation by the corporate community.  Corporations engage in a form of self 
regulation with respect to corporate governance, primarily through listing requirements of  
SROs, such as the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, Inc. ("NASDAQ").  For 
instance, SRO rules require members to have a majority of independent directors.285 
Further, the compensation and nominated committees must be staffed with these 
independent directors.286 The compensation committee itself must have a charter and the 
committee must  review and approve company goals related to executive 
compensation.287 
More recently, however, the SROs enacted new listing standards in an attempt to 
strengthen board independence requirements and expand shareholder approval 
requirements for certain executive compensation plans.288 Under NYSE requirements 
shareholder approval is a requirement: (1) for equity compensation plans; (2) prior to the 
issuance of common stock to directors, officers and related parties in the event such 
issuance exceeds one percent of the number of shares of common stock of the company 
or one percent of the voting power prior to issuance and (3) prior to the issuance of 
common stock if the stock will have voting power exceeding twenty percent of the voting 
power or twenty percent of the common stock.289 NASDAQ Rule 4350 is similar and 
 
284 The Business Roundtable responded to the SEC’s efforts to increase shareholder access to the ballot 
with a letter arguing that there is no need for reform and that it would actually be bad to let shareholders 
have greater access to the election process.  Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, The Business 
Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (December 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (last visited July 25, 2006).  For a 
critique of this position, see Lucian Bebchuk, Corporate Governance: Directors vs. Shareholders?: The 
Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557 
(2005). 
285 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11. 
286 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 11. 
287 Pay Without Performance, supra note 1, at 195. 
288 See, NYSE, Listed Company Manual, P 303A.08, available at http:// 
www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930957.html?enable=section&number=3&ssnumber=312.00 (last visited July 
17, 2006) [hereinafter NYSE]; NASDAQ, Marketplace Rules, IM 4350-5, available at 
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000656, as amended, 
available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000656  
(last visited July 17, 2006) (these amendments have been approved but the effective date has not yet been 
announced)[hereinafter NASDAQ].  See also, Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: 
Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote 
Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1000-11 (2004)(concluding that these 
measures do address some abuses but do not change the executive compensation decision making process). 
289 NYSE, supra note 299, at 312.03. 
THE HOUSE OF MOUSE AND BEYOND   45  
mandates shareholder approval of certain equity compensation plans.290 
Although these efforts increase shareholder involvement in compensation matters, they 
do so only on a marginal basis, with respect to certain equity compensation plans.291 
Even for these plans, shareholder involvement in the awards made under such plans is 
only contemplated in a limited situation where the award is enough to strike the one 
percent threshold, a scenario unlikely in the context of a publicly held company.  The 
SRO rules related to equity compensation plans will not result in changes needed to 
executive compensation practices as a whole. 
 
SRO rules leave executive compensation practices as a whole undisturbed.  Shareholder 
involvement is only with respect to a small aspect of executive compensation.  The rules 
requiring independent directors do not change the character of executive compensation 
decisions since these directors are still subject to influences that impair their ability to act 
more in line with shareholder interests, such as a desire to get reelected and to get along 
with the current CEO.292 While it might be possible for listing requirements to be 
substantially amended to overhaul the way in which interests are aligned and the way in 
which compensation, particularly equity based, is used, 293 such reforms appear unlikely 
given the current relationships between executives and directors.   
 
Moreover, the SROs have always had the ability to act in this area, yet have failed to take 
action.  Despite shareholder calls for increased disclosure, most companies are only 
responding to the threat of SEC requirements under the Proposed Regulations. 294 If past 
practice is any indicator, companies will not make changes to executive compensation 
practices on their own, even in the face of shareholder objections once enhanced 
disclosure is made.295 
VI.  Conclusion   
 
The Proposed Regulations, even with the shortcomings discussed above, is nevertheless 
likely to become final regulation.  Even if the prospects for revising executive 
compensation accountability is not at hand, disclosure is meaningful and companies will 
have to comply.  One can anticipate some problems in applying the Proposed Regulations 
to specific compensation agreements, perquisites and retirement and severance benefits.  
These problems with disclosure, information overload and the looming challenge of 
boilerplate, remain to be resolved. 
 
290 NASDAQ, supra note 299, at IM4350-5. 
291 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. at 1012-13. 
292 See infra, Part IV.A. 
293 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 971, 1000-11 (arguing that reforms to listing requirements could potentially cure many of 
the problems with executive compensation). 
294 Lucian Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, Forbes, January 19, 2006. 
295 Lucian Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, Forbes, January 19, 2006. 
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As we address the broader issues raised by ever rising executive compensation packages, 
we must recognize that using information disclosure as a primary regulatory approach is 
an ambitious goal and may not be workable in the absence of other measures.  While the 
lesser goal of the Proposed Regulations of increasing disclosure is in reach, some of the 
issues such as defining compensation elements present under the Existing Regulations 
will remain.   Companies will be subject to an increased burden of information disclosure 
as a filed document creating liability for misstatements under the Exchange Act, but 
while the information is supposed to help the public understand executive compensation 
packages and practices, there is no specific remedy to shareholders in the absence of a 
lack of due care, good faith or waste to react to the information presented short of selling 
their stock. 
 
Although the federal government has traditionally been involved in information 
disclosure of the type set forth in the Regulations and has on occasion entered the realm 
of corporate governance more directly, corporate governance is traditionally a matter for 
state government regulations.  Creating a system of corporate governance where the 
decision makers concerning executive compensation matters are accountable to the 
shareholders is daunting.  While finalizing the Proposed Regulations may have a calming 
effect on a public that objects to compensation packages that do not relate to performance 
of the executive, a closer examination reveals that this issue is far from resolved and will 
require more attention. 
